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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, a number of Articles of the Uniform Commercial
Code have been re-examined and officially revised. Articles 8 and
9 have been the subject of official revisions, receiving rather rigorous overhauls, 1 and a revision of Article 6 is in process. 2 Not to
be ignored, Articles 3 and 4 remain under study by a committee
pursuant to the procedures of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, following criticism of prior attempts at revision. 3
The forces causing the perceived need to revise these various
articles were not necessarily the same. The re-examination of Articles 6 and 9 was, in large part, triggered by actual difficulties
arising in practice and anticipated difficulties discovered as a result of analysis by scholars and practitioners. On the other hand,
a redrafting of Articles 3, 4, and 8 was thought necessary because
of the drastic changes in the way many of the transactions covered
1. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE (ALI) & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1972) (Official
Text and Conforming Amendments to Related Sections); PERMANENT EDITORIAL
Bo. FOR THE u.c.c., PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE 8 (1977). The 1972
amendments have been adopted by 40 or more jurisdictions. The 1978 version
has been adopted by California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia and Wyoming. Maine has added a special section to its code covering
the non-certified security. Article 2 was not changed by either the 1972 or 1978
revisions.
2. The Hawkland subcommittee of the American Bar Association's U.C.C.
Committee produced one draft. The Illustrative Draft of Article 6 prepared by
the American Bar Association's Committee to Review Article 6, reprinted in appendix to Article 6, 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CooE SERIES 143-51 (CALLAGHAN
1984). A committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) is presently producing another. Its drafts are still
tentative.
3. The "3-4-8" Committee working under the Permanent Editorial Board, a
joint ALI-NCCUSL board, had produced several drafts drawn by Reporters Hal
Scott of Harvard and Peter L. Murray of Yale Law School. See, e.g., PERMANENT
EDITORIAL Bo. FOR THE U.C.C., UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CooE, DRAFT No. 3
(June 2, 1983). At an exposure conference in Williamsburg, Va., in 1983, this
draft was extensively criticized. An effort to develop a consensus among the
affected interests was undertaken. A Permanent Editorial Board meeting was
held on June 6-7, 1985. As a consequence of this meeting, the NCCUSL has
appointed Professors Warren and Jordan ofU.C.L.A. as reporters to attempt to
draft wire-transfer statutes and amendments to Articles 3 and 4 on a conservative basis. The new group held its first meeting in January 1986. See Miller,
Report on New Payments Code, in Consumer Financial Services Report, 41 Bus. LAw.
1007 (1986).
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by those articles are now conducted, particularly, the increased
importance of the noncertificated security and the use of electronic messages to effect the transfer of deposit institution credit.
It is possible that both types of forces now require that another Code Article be addressed. Specifically, is the time ripe for
re-examination of all or several parts of Article 2? This article,
the oldest in the Code, has not been subjected to significant
changes for almost four decades. 4 Since that time, there have
been considerable changes in our ways of life and of doing business, changes which may justify a rethinking not only of the substantive provisions of Article 2 but of its scope of coverage as
well. For example, the steady decline of our workforce engaged
in manufacturing has been offset by the rapid growth of service
industries. 5 This decline and offsetting growth raises the question
of whether the Code should now cover contracts for commercial
services, including franchising. In any event, should not the line,
if any, between sales of goods and sales of services be clarified? 6
4. The senior author joined the U.C.C. drafting team in 1947. From that
time until the 1952-1955 proceedings of the New York Law Revision Commission, there were few revisions to Article 2. There is some doubt in the authors'
minds as to whether the 1956 revisions actually improved Article 2. The revisions proposed by Supplement No. 1 and approved at the 1954 meetings of the
sponsoring organizations also are of questionable benefit, although the placing
in U.C.C. § 2-207 of a reference to "different" terms did appear in the November 1951 draft. See infra note 94.
5. In 1947, "Final Sales" of all goods were $140.3 billion, and "Final Sales"
of services were $71.3 billion. Services were 50.8% of the goods figure. U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUSINESS STATISTICS 250 (22d biennial ed. 1979). By
1985, the figure for all goods had increased to $1,644.2 billion, but services had
increased to $1,928.8 billion, and thus were 114.2% of goods. While goods
increased in the 37 years by 1,099.7%, services increased by 2,470.7% or more
than twice as fast as goods. Telephone call to Department of Commerce (1985).
6. Several annual surveys of Article 2 in Business Lawyer have referred to the
unsatisfactory "sale or service" distinctions made by the courts. See, e.g., Leary &
Frisch, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 39 Bus. LAw. 1851, 1854 (1983). Recent cases referring to unsatisfactory "sale or service" distinctions, include R.W. Murray Co. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983) (contract to supply aluminum framing held sale of goods, not service); Redwine v. Baptist General
Convention, 681P.2d1121 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (charging of patient for use of
heart-lung oxygenator during open heart surgery held service, not sale).
Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), is an interesting case as it held that doctors perform services even when goods are supplied. The mammary prosthesis in Perfetti was supplied by the hospital to the
doctor who implanted it. Id. at 666. Because she could not sue the doctor under
the Code, the patient had to sue the manufacturer as a third party beneficiary for
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 655. Unfortunately for
the patient, the court, after concluding she had standing, decided that the warranty was not breached. Id. at 656.
In addition, a member of the Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales,
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Most recently, the Permanent Editorial Board has approved
the personal property leasing act for inclusion in Article 2 of the
Code. 7 But since it is already under intensive study, both as to its
place in the law of the United States 8 and the rules for international transactions, 9 we avoid discussion of leasing at this time.
Quite apart from personal property leasing, the whole matter of
bailments for processing, 10 tolling arrangements, 11 and commercial consignments 12 may need to be reconsidered in light of the
Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title of the ABA Committee on the U.C.C.
has several times raised the issue that precedent for commercial cases involving
many types of service issues is inadequately segregated and therefore
inaccessible.
7. Conversation with Ronald DeKoven, Reporter for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, on the Personal Property Leasing Act.
8. The NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee under the chairmanship
of Edward I. Cutler, Esq., of Florida, and a subcommittee of commissioners
working with Reporters Ronald DeKoven, Esq., of New York and Professor
James A. Martin of Michigan, and has produced several drafts of a "Personal
Property Leasing Act." The Act now is a finally approved uniform law, and has
been approved for integration into Article 2 of the Code. Much information on
this matter is contained in the materials distributed at an ALI-ABA Invitational
Symposium on Personal Property Leasing, held in New York on February 17-18,
1983.
9. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) is preparing a proposed International Convention on Personal
Property Leasing. (UNIDROIT, 1981, Study LIX-Doc. 13 (original: English.
Rome, March 1981)). There has been one exposure conference in the United
States on personal property leasing under ALl-ABA auspices. It was held on
May 7-8, 1981. The ALI-ABA materials distributed for the seminar contain
much valuable background materials. Exposure conferences have been held,
also, in other parts of the world.
IO. See, e.g., Medomak Canning Co. v. William Underwood Co., 25 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 437 (Bankr. D. Me. 1977) (where company gave cannery
ingredients, and packaging and shipping materials for canned goods, finished
product constituted bailment for processing). Do these constitute sales, a consignment, or a security interest? Neither U.C.C. § 2-326 nor U.C.C. § 9-114 are
entirely clear as to what are consignments for processing. But should not a bailment for repair be differently treated? Should a return of the thing bailed be the
test to distinguish consignment and bailment?
11. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Bristol Indus. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (tolling agreement whereby GMC
would supply metals to debtor which were comingled with other metals to produce bronze alloy strip did not create bailment), rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Harrington, A Caveat/or Commodity Processing Industries:
Insolvent Processors' Creditors vs. Putative Owners of Raw Materials, 16 U.C.C. LJ. 322
(1984); supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., Quaker City Iron Works v. Ganz, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 458 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (since Wicaco maintained place of business at which it
dealt in goods of the kind consigned, these goods were deemed "sale or return"
and subject to claims of creditors); Martin v. First Nat'I Bank, 127 Ill. App. 3d
485, 468 N.E.2d 1002 (1984) (consignor must comply with filing requirments of
Article 9 in order to claim perfected security interests in proceeds of sale, with
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changing practices and needs of the parties involved.
In addition to a change in scope, perhaps it is also time to
change the structure of Article 2. Should not consideration be
given to whether certain things may require separate treatment
for Article 2 purposes,just as security interests in various types of
collateral (i.e., inventory, equipment, fixtures, motor vehicles,
mobile equipment, and various intangibles) require special treatment for some Article 9 purposes? Some years ago Professor
Grant Gilmore gave a series of lectures, later published in pamphlet form, under the title, "The Death of Contract." 13 But perhaps it was not death that we were witnessing but a proliferation
with a perceived need for special and perhaps conflicting rules in
particular instances. Rules of interpretation in insurance contracts may or may not be suitable for sales of goods or sales of
commercial services. Rules of warranty in sales of turbines may
not be suitable for consumer purposes, 14 or for sales of hogs 15 or
of blood, 16 or for the transplant of embryos of cattle. 17
priority over bank which had provided financing to consignee); Duesenberg,
Consignments Under the U.C.C.: A Comment on Emergi,ng Principles, 26 Bus. LAw. 565
(1970); Duesenberg, Consignment Distribution Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
Code, Bankruptcy and Antitrust Considerations, 2 VAL. U.L. REV. 227 (1968); Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the U. C. C.-Part 5: Consignments and
Equipment leases, 77 CoM. LJ. 108 (1972). Should not U.C.C. § 2-326 contain a
reference to U.C.C. § 9-114?
13. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (series of lectures given
in Law Forum Series of College of Law, Ohio State University, in April 1970).
14. For a discussion of the "lemon laws" of 35 states, see infra notes 154-57
and accompanying text.
15. See Uchtmann, Sarhan & Charalambous, Do Statutory Exclusions of Implied
Warranties in Livestock Sales Immunize Sellers from Liability? 8 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
21 (1982). For a further discussion of implied warranties, see note 28 and accompanying text.
16. Fourteen states have non-uniform amendments to the U.C.C. that declare blood transfusions and organ transplants to be "the rendition ofa service."
See infra note 25. Thirty-four states have independent statutes to the same effect.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1481 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 82-1608 (1976);
Cow. REV. STAT. § 4-2-102(b) (1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19139-(L) (West 1977); GA. CooE ANN. § 51-l-28(a) (1982); HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 327.51 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
§ 5102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); lowA CooE ANN.§ 142 A.8 (West 1972); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1980); KY. REV. STAT. § 139.125 (1982); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § I 764(B) (West 1972), Mo. GEN. PROV. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1982);
MINN. STAT. § 525.928 (1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-1 (1972); Mo. REV.
STAT.§ 431.069 (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 50-33-102 (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-4001 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:8-b (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAw § 580.4 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-220.10
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 4l-02-33(3)(d) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 2151 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 10021 (Purdon 1977); S.C. CooE ANN. § 44-43.10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH
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Although we ask whether Article 2 should be re-examined, it
is not our only question. A second question posed is: What are
the sources to which one should look in order to discover whether
there is a strong enough need to justify a revision? 18 In addition
to mentioning sources, we offer a few examples illustrative of the
fruits which these sources can produce. By doing so, we hope to
spur additional interest because, if discussion of a new Article 2 is
to begin, the sooner it begins the better. Revisions take time. Six
years can pass from the time a decision is made to revise to the
submission of a revision for state-by-state adoption, 19 after which
a decade may elapse before widespread adoption occurs and the
revision becomes effective. Thus, in 1986, we should plan for the
needs of A.D. 2000, even if we only see the future through a glass
darkly.
II.

SOURCES FOR DISCOVERING A NEED FOR REVISION

There seem to be many sources from which information as to
the need for revision of Article 2 may be derived. One source,
suggested by the Chairman of the Uniform Commercial Code
Committee of the American Bar Association, is a review of the
non-uniform amendments to Article 2 already adopted by several
states. 20 Another source is the many ad hoc statutes, both state
CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (1984); VA. CODE § 32.1-297 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.54.120 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.31 (West 1974).
17. There are no statutes on this yet, but the authors have been told that
the practice exists.
18. Absent some consensus on what is needed, any project, as has apparently happened to the drafts of the proposed New Payments Code, will founder
upon the reef of the "If it ain't broke don't fix it" syndrome. But, as the original
enactment of the U.C.C. shows, a consensus can be developed.
19. For example, work on the 1972 amendments to Article 9 started sometime in 1965 with the 1965 report of some 300 non-uniform amendments to
Article 9. PERMANENT EDITORIAL Bo. FOR THE u.c.c., REPORT No. 2 (1965).
The first draft report was submitted in 1968, a second in 1970, and the final
draft was submitted in 1971, with an Official Text and Comments approved edition issued in 1972. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL Bo. FOR THE U.C.C., PRELIMINARY
DRAFT No. l (1968); PERMANENT EDITORIAL Bo. FOR THE U.C.C., PRELIMINARY
DRAFT No. 2 (1970); PERMANENT EDITORIAL Bo. FOR THE U.C.C., FINAL REPORT

(1971).
The 1978 amendments to Article 8 proceeded at a bit faster pace. Revisions
to Articles 3 and 4 have been underway since 1978, and no consensus has yet
developed despite two extensive conferences at Williamsburg and numerous Exposure Drafts. See supra note 3.
20. See C. Mooney, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Suroey,
40 Bus. LAw. 1143, 1144 (1985). Mr. Mooney noted that the Committee on
Uniform Commercial Code is organizing a review of the non-uniform state
amendments to Article 2 as an initial step of a thorough review. Id. He stated
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and federal, that, while not a part of the Code, effectively change
its rules in selected commercial areas. Reliance on this source
would also entail consideration of the impact of consumer protection statutes on the provisions of the Code, and raises the issue of
incorporating these statutes into the Code or of placing an exception in Code rules where a consumer law differs. A third source is
the volume of litigation generated by particular Code sections.
Fourth, suggestions for change might be the product of examination of judicial splits of authority (without regard to the volume of
cases) as such a division of interpretation may be a harbinger of
future trouble. A fifth source might involve cases in which judicial interpretations appear inconsistent with present reasonable
commercial practices. Sixth, an analysis should be made of the
areas where the Second Restatement of Contracts differs from the
Code. Seventh, the differences between Article 2 and the rules of
other countries should be considered.2 1 And finally, the eighth
source should be the combined experience of those operating in
the field-not only the attorneys, but also the practical people
who daily make deals.
All of this is a rather large order. Therefore, we propose to
do no more than offer examples illustrative of what can be garnered from a few of the indicated sources. It is anticipated that
the examples will show the desirability of a more thorough review
and possibly demonstrate a need for revision of Article 2.
III.
A.

SOME EXAMPLES

Warranty Law

We pick as our first example the law of warranties because
several sources indicate trouble in this area. For one thing, the
volume of warranty litigation is larger than litigation on any other
that a growing number of state statutes vary the effect of the U.C.C. without
actually amending the U.C.C. provisions, thereby making it difficult for counsel
involved in multi-state transactions to identify the non-uniform state statutes.
Id. As a result of this and other current issues, Mr. Mooney indicated that there
is a need for a comprehensive long-range plan for the study and modification of
the U.C.C. Id. at 1145.
21. See, e.g, ONTARIO LAw REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON SALE OF GooDs,
( 1979); Lando, Standard Contracts: A Proposal and a Perspective, in l 0 SCANDINAVIAN
STUDIES IN LAw 130-31 (F. Schmidt ed. 1966);Jorensen, Contract as Fo'/711, in 10
SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAw 122 (F. Schmidt ed. 1966); UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 97/18, Apr. 10, 1980, reprinted in J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAw FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 165-70
(1982).
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topic. 22 For another, "uniform" Code rules have been rendered
non-uniform by numerous ad hoc statutes and local Code amendments dealing with warranty law.
1.

Negating Implied Warranties: Blood Transfusions and Livestock

If a merchant seller wishes to negate the existence of implied
warranties, the Code provides a method for doing so in U.C.C.
§ 2-316. 23 But the Code way is not necessarily the only way. One
alternative method of avoiding the imposition of implied warranties is to characterize the transaction statutorily as a sale of a service. For example, the furnishing of blood for transfusions could
be characterized as a medical service. 24 Some fourteen states
have added to the Code amendments sponsored by the medical
associations which effectively remove such sale from its scope. 25
Other states have specifically legislated against having the implied
warranties of the Code apply to such transactions. 26
Another legislative approach can be called the "separate stat22. A rough estimate of the litigation involving warranties reported in the
U.C.C. Reporter Seroice (Callaghan) is apparent from the fact that the U.C.C. Case
Digest (Callaghan) devotes over 1,000 pages to U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-318

inclusive.
23. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978) (Exclusion or Modification of Warranties).
Also relevant is U.C.C. § 2-312, which provides for implied warranties of title
and against infringement, and instructs on a method for exclusion of such
warranties.
24. Theoretically, in such a case the Code warranty provisions would be
inapplicable to blood transfusions regardless of any statute declaring it to be a
service. They are statutorily applicable only if the underlying transaction is a
"sale of goods." See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) (implied warranty of
merchantability); id. § 2-315 (1978) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose). A number of cases at common law have held that furnishing blood is a
service, hence no implied warranties apply. See, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros.
Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973); Fisher v. Sibley
Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116
Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967);Jennings v. Roosevelt Hosp., 83 Misc. 2d
1, 372 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1975). But see Semler v. Knowling, 325 N.W.2d
395, 399 (Iowa 1982) ("Exclusion from Article 2, however, does not foreclose
the application of its policies and reasons.").
25. See ALA. CODE§ 7-2-314(4) (1984); ALASKA STAT.§ 45.02.316(e) (1980);
ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 85-2-316(3)(d)(i) (1961 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 42-102(b) (1973 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN.§ 672.2-316(5) (West 1966 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN.§ 11-2316(5) (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (West 1958 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 41-02-33(3)(d) (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 57A-2-315.l (1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 2.316(e)
(Vernon 1968); Wvo. STAT. § 34-21-233(c)(iv) (1977).
26. Most states have appended the warranty exclusion for blood transfusions to one of the existing warranty sections, making it somewhat doubtful if
more than the warranty provisions are excluded, although the intent was proba-
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ute approach." In this situation, the modifying statute is not an
integral part of the Code, but rather is .found, if one had been
alerted to look for it, elsewhere in the statute books. The statutes
of thirty-four states dealing with blood transfusions and human
organ transplants are of this latter type. 2 '
In the area of livestock marketing, some twenty-six states
have statutes, adopted as amendments to the Code, that withdraw
sales of various categories of livestock from full coverage by the
Code's implied warranty provisions. 28 Strangely, few states specify "poultry" as livestock to be covered by their amendments. 29
Some use the names given various species, such as "equine, bovine, and porcine," 30 while others refer to "cattle, hogs and
bly to exclude the entire subject matter from the Code. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 85-2-316(3)(d)(i) (1961 & Supp. 1985).
27. For a listing of states that have statutorily mandated that blood injections or transfusions are services and not sales, see supra note 16.
28. Nebraska was the first to adopt this type of legislation. The provisions
are in ALA. CODE § 2-15-4 (1975 & Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2316(d)(ii) (1961 & Supp. 1985); CAL. AGRIC. CODE§ 18501 (West 1968); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 672.316(3)(d) (West 1966 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN.§ l l-2316(3)(d) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-316(3)(d) (Smith-Hurd 1963 &
Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § l-2-316(3)(d) (West 1980); lowA CODE ANN.
§ 554A.l (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 84-2-316(3)(d) (1983); KY. REV.
STAT. § 355.2-316(3)(d) (1972 & Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 440.2316(3)(d) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315
(1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 277.141 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 302-316(3)(d) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-316(3)(d) (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 41-02-33(3)(e) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(c)(4) (Page 1979 &
Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-316(3)(d) (West 1963 & Supp.
1985); OR. REV. STAT.§ 72.3160(3)(d) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.§ 57A2-316.l (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-315 (Supp. 1984); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN.§ 2.316(£) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 701A-2316(5) (1980 & Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 62A.2-316(3)(d) (1966 &
Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 402.316(3)(c) (West 1964 & Supp. 1985); WYo.
STAT. § 34-21-233(c)(v) (1977 & Supp. 1985). For the significant text of these
statutes, see Uchtmann, supra note 15, at 23-25.
Those states which had adopted the variation when the Uchtmann article
was written covered only 26.5% of the 1980 poultry sales for the country,
whereas the 21 cattle states covered 71. l % of 1980 sales, the hog states covered
76.6% of 1980 sales, and the sheep states covered 48. l % of 1980 sales. Id. at
32-33.
29. This is only done by Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-316(3)(d)
(Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1985); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. § 355.2-316(3)(d)
(1972 & Supp. 1984); and Washington, WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 62A.2316(3)(d) (1966 & Supp. 1985).
30. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-316(d)(i) (1961 & Supp. 1985); KY.
REV. STAT. § 355.2-316(3)(d) (1972 & Supp. 1984). The descriptions are quite
diverse. Nebraska started with "cattle, hogs and sheep." NEB. REV. STAT. § 2316(3)(d) (1980). Alabama uses "cattle, swine, sheep, goats, horses, mules and
asses." ALA. CoDE § 2-15-4 (1975 & Supp. 1985). Florida mentions only "cattle, swine, sheep, horse, poultry and turkeys, or the unborn young of any of the
foregoing." FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 672.3(d) (West 1966 & Supp. 1985). The Illinois
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sheep." 31 A few do not define livestock. 32

2. Auction Sales
Another area where there appears to be an implied warranty
problem, as well as perhaps other problems, is auction sales.
Where a sale is by auction, does the auctioneer make any warranties ?33 Some case law, pre-Code as well as post-Code, would
make the existence of a warranty of title by an auctioneer turn on
whether the auctioneer discloses the name of the person delivering the goods for sale. 34 But there is no direct legislative guistatute covers "cattle, swine, horses, poultry & turkeys, or the unborn young of
any of the foregoing." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-316(3)(d) (Smith-Hurd 1963
& Supp. 1985). The Georgia statute is quite limited, applying only to sales "by a
licensed auction company or agent," but apparently including within warranty
protection "brucellosis reactor cattle detected at an official state laboratory
within 30 days following the date of sale." GA. CODE ANN. § l l-2-316(3)(d)
(l 982). This exclusion relates to disease not detectable by inspection.
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(3)(d) (West 1966 & Supp. 1985)
(cattle, hogs); GA. CODE ANN. § l l-2-316(3)(d) (1982) (cattle, hogs, sheep);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 440.2316(3)(d) (West 1967 & Supp. 1985) (cattle,
hogs, sheep); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 75-2-315 (1981) (cattle, hogs, sheep); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 57A-2-316.l (1980) (cattle, hogs, sheep).
Oklahoma specifically provides that implied warranties apply to sales of horses. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. l2A, § 2-316(3)(d) (West 1963 & Supp. 1985).
32. The following states do not define "livestock": Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 84-2-316(3)(d) (1983); MISSOURI, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 277.141 (Vernon
Supp. 1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. l2A, § 2-316(3)(d) (West 1963 &
Supp. 1985); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3160(3)(d) (1981) (exclusion does
not apply to sale of livestock "for immediate slaughter"); Texas, TEx. Bus. &
CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(£) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1985).
For a further discussion of these statutes, see Purcell, What Warranties do
Fanners Give When They Sell Their Livestock, 2 AGRIC. L.J. 117 (l 980); Note, The
Iowa Livestock Warranty Exemption: Illusory Protection for the Buyer, 67 lowA L. REV.
133 (1981). The absence of warranty litigation over horses sold for breeding
purposes is explained by the general presence of adequate insurance. See Fabiani, Livestock Insurance: A Horse of a Different Color, 1979 INS. LJ. 431.
33. The question may go deeper. Should most disclosed or statutory
agents acting in good faith for another seller make any warranties under the
"innocent agent" rule except as to their own good faith and the observance of
the regularly observed commercial standards of their respective spheres of action? See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-417(4), 3-419(3), 8-318 (1978).
34. It has always been the common law rule that an auctioneer generally is
not liable for a defect in title where the name of its principal is disclosed at the
time of sale. See, e.g., Oliver v. Eureka Springs Sales Co., 22 Ark. 94, 257 S.W.2d
367 (l 953) (plaintiff had cause of action against sales company that auctioned
stolen heifers for undisclosed principal); Mercer v. Leihy, 139 Mich. 447, 102
N.W. 972 (1905) (where auctioneer's principal was present at auction and identified himself, auction company was not liable for selling principal's stolen horse);
Corn Land Farms Co. v. Barcus, 105 Neb. 869, 182 N.W. 487 (1921) (auction
company's clerk not liable to purchaser for breach of warranty of title at auction
sale); Gessler v. Winton, 24 Tenn. App. 411, 145 S.W.2d 789 (l 940) (auctioneer
who sold mules as principal, not agent, held liable for breach of implied
warranty).
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dance in the Code as to either this point or the proper time and
means for disclosure. By interpreting the wording of U.C.C. § 2312, the disclosure must be ruled to be a circumstance indicating
no claim of title. 35 Perhaps, when Karl N. Llewellyn was drafting
Article 2, much of this analysis of warranties in the auction sale
area was to be included in a proposed article on commercial
agency, which never appeared. 3 6
Aside from an auctioneer's warranty of title, what of other
warranties in the auction area? Perhaps the drafters felt that the
use of the word "seller" in U.C.C. §§ 2-314 37 and 2-315, 38 toThe Uniform Sales Act sought to alter this rule. Section 13(4) stated: "This
section (imposing the warranty of title) shall not, however, be held to render
liable a sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee, or other person professing to sell, by
virtue of authority in fact or law, goods in which a third person has a legal or
equitable interest." UNIF. SALES AcT § 13(4), l U.L.A. 203 (1950). The common law rule has regained its vigor in cases under the Code. See, e.g., Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973) (auction company held liable for breach of implied warranty by selling stolen car and not disclosing name of principal).
35. Section 2-312(2) states that a warranty of title "will be excluded or
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason
to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person may have." U.C.C.
§ 2-312(2) (1978) (emphasis added).
36. See Llewellyn, Commercial Code: Sketch of Prospective Subject Matter
(Prepared for W.E. Stanley, October 12, 1943) (Llewellyn Papers, Univ. of Chi.
Law School Library, indexed p. 47 as V. 1943, U.C.C. ("Other material not certainly needed for publication, which it may prove desirable to include: a commercial agency . . . . ")). In a December 1944 Memo, Plans for Uniform
Commercial Code (Index p. 48, 1944 V,I. I.e.), Professor Llewellyn says that
"the commercial agency is generally agreed on,"
37. Section 2-314 specifically provides:
(l) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with r:espe'ct to goods of that kind. Under
this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) In the case offungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
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gether with the reference to the "seller" as someone other than
the auctioneer in U.C.C. § 2-328, 39 would be sufficient. But the
situation would be more certain if the problem were specifically
addressed. 40

3.

Warranties and the Magnuson-Moss Act

Furthermore, the Code formulations on warranty need to be
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) (emphasis added).
38. Section 2-315 specifically provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978) (emphasis added).
39. Section 2-328 specifically provides:
( 1) In a sale by auction if goods are put up in lots each lot is the subject
of a separate sale.
(2) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so announces
by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner. Where a bid is
made while the hammer is falling in acceptance of a prior bid the auctioneer may in his discretion reopen the bidding or declare the goods
sold under the bid on which the hammer was falling.
(3) Such a sale is with reserve unless the goods are in explicit terms put
up without reserve. In an auction with reserve the auctioneer may withdraw the goods at any time until he announces completion of the sale.
In an auction without reserve, after the auctioneer calls for bids on an
article or lot, that article or lot cannot be withdrawn unless no bid is
made within a reasonable time. In either case a bidder may retract his
bid until the auctioneer's announcement of completion of the sale, but
a bidder's retraction does not revive any previous bid.
(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the sellers behalf or the seller
makes or procures such a bid, and notice has not been given that liberty for
such bidding is reserved, the buyer may at his option avoid the sale or
take the goods at the price of the last good faith bid prior to the completion of the sale. This subsection shall not apply to any bid at a
forced sale.
U.C.C. § 2-328 (1978) (emphasis added).
40. The use of the word "seller" in U .C.C. § 2-312 has not provided a safe
harbor for the auctioneer. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (auctioneer held liable for
breach of implied warranty of title when he auctioned stolen car and did not
disclose name of principal); United States v. Chappel Livestock Auctions, 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 299 (8th Cir. 1975) (Callaghan) (state law exempting auctioneer from liability for selling personal property which was subject to security interest, if he acts in good faith and without notice of the security interest, for
principal whose identity has been disclosed). See also GA. CODE ANN. § l l-2316(3)(d) (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-109.01 (1981) (making auctioneer not
liable to holder of security interest for sales made in good faith for debtor).
Note that the Georgia statute excludes the implied warranty with respect to cattle, hogs, and sheep only when they are sold by an auction company or an agent.
But why is this necessary if the auctioneer makes no warranties? It is, therefore,
uncertain whether the word "seller" in other state Codes always will exclude
warranties.
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reconsidered in the light of title I of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. 41 While
Code formulations can not change a federal statute, they can, as
under the Bankruptcy Code, provide a source of law where the
federal statute uses state law terms. 42 Also, changes in Code formulations could potentially harmonize state law warranty concepts with those of the federal statute.
a.

Duration of Implied Warranties

An example of nonconformity can be found in sections
104(a)(2) 4 3 and 108(b) 44 of the Magnuson-Moss Act, which refer
to the "duration of any implied warranty." Yet the general rule of
state law is that an implied warranty is "broken when made" unless it explicitly extends to future performance. This is addressed
in U.C.C. § 2-725(2), which provides:
A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends tofuture performance of the goods and discovery of the
breach must await the time of such performance, the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should be
discovered. 45
41. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2301-12 (1982).
42. For example, the Bankruptcy Code requires that "adequate assurance"
of future performance be given to a party to an executory contract or unexpired
lease whenever either is to be assigned by a trustee, 11 U.S.C. § 365(0(2)(B)
(1982), or assumed following a default. Id.§ 365(b)(l)(C). The term "adequate
assurance" also appears in U.C.C. § 2-609 where it serves very much the same
function-to preserve a party's expectation of future performance. Therefore,
there is no reason why its construction under state law should not be consulted
when the adequacy of proposed assurances must be determined under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1982). This section specifically provides:
(a) In order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by means
of a written warranty to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty(2) notwithstanding section [108(b)], such warrantor may not impose any limitation on the duration of any implied warranty on
the product;
Id.

44. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1982). This section specifically provides:
(b) For purposes of this [Act] (other than section [104(a)(2)]), implied
warranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is
set forth in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed
on the face of the warranty.
Id.

45. u.c.c. § 2-725(2) (1978).
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This excerpt follows a statement providing that "[a] cause of
action accrues when a breach occurs," 46 thereby explicitly barring
general application of the "discovery rule." Yet in products liability cases and other situations involving delayed reactions to the
use of drugs, or injuries resulting from use of a product long after
it was purchased, the "discovery rule" may be essential to prevent
a serious failure of justice.
The issue, then, under the Code, is whether there is any "duration" to an implied warranty, i.e., any explicit extension to future performance. In neither U.C.C. § 2-314, 47 on the implied
warranty of merchantability, nor U.C.C. § 2-315, 48 on fitness for a
particular purpose, is there explicit use of the words "future performance." Yet, is not some duration of performance implicit in
the language of "fitness for purpose," where the purpose, ordinary or particular, contemplates future performances?
The implied warranty of merchantability found in U.C.C. § 2314 does include a warranty of fitness "for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used. " 49 Thus, future performance
would seem to be indicated by the Code language. But does that
language "explicitly extend" to future performance? 50 Neither
the comments to U.C.C. § 2-314 nor the comments to U.C.C. § 2725 offer any guidance. The Magnuson-Moss Act's definition of
an implied warranty, however, seems to indicate a recognition
that the reference to "duration" may modify state law. 51
46. Id.
47. For the text of§ 2-314, see supra note 37.
48. For the text of § 2-315, see supra note 38.
49. See V.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). For the text of§ 2-314, see supra note 37.
50. By its present nature, an implied warranty does not "explicitly extend"
to future performance. Stumler v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 644 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.
1981) (implied warranties by definition cannot extend to future performances).
See Clark v. Delaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1981) (no breach
of implied warranty where plaintiff's cattle developed mastitis after defendant
installed milking equipment); Little Rock School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 264 Ark.
757, 574 S.W.2d 669 (1978) (implied warranty of fitness does not extend to
future performance); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 Ill. App. 3d 867, 315
N.E.2d 580 (1974) (no breach of warranty with respect to tractor sold where
there was no explicit warranty or representation as to its future performance).
But the question is, why shouldn't some aspects of the implied warranty guarantee a reasonable period of future use absent severe user abuse?
51. Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the term "implied warranty"
is defined to mean "an implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by
sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title) in connection with the sale by a supplier
of a consumer product." 15 U.S.C. § 230 I (7) (1982) (emphasis added). Compare
15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) ( 1982) (permitting limitation of duration of implied warranties "to the duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration") with U.C.C.
§ 2-725(2) (1978) ("A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
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Consumer Protections

In the current work being done under the auspices of the 3-48 Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code, a tentative decision has been made to eliminate consumer protections from those three Code articles. 52 A
similar decision was made in the drafting of Article 9, and U.C.C.
§ 9-206 contains an express reference to contrary consumer
law. 53 In the twenty-nine years since Article 9 was originally approved, many state statutes have been promulgated which use the
same definition of "consumer" as does Article 9 in its definition
of "consumer goods." 54 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted for state adoption a
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act. Its definition also fits
within the concept of "consumer" found in the Code. 55 The definitions in the Magnuson-Moss Act, unfortunately, do not. Hence,
the Magnuson-Moss Act's provisions cannot be ignored on the
ground that the Act is a federal "consumer" statute by a suggestion that Article 2 is subject to consumer statutes.
The term "consumer" is defined in the Magnuson-Moss Act
as the buyer of a consumer product other than for purposes of
resale. 56 "Consumer product" is defined as a product "normally
used for personal, family or household purposes." 57 There is no
guidance in the Act as to what "normal" means. The regulations
issued thereunder by the Federal Trade Commission state:
This means that a product is a "consumer product" if
mad~:

....

except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance

)

.

52. The Permanent Editorial Board so decided in early 1984 and sent to
several interested parties a memorandum of their decision. See Miller, Report on
the New Payments Code, 40 Bus. LAw. 1139 (1985).
53. Section 9-206(1) begins with the following: "Subject to any statute or
decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer
goods .... " U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (1978). A "good" is a "consumer good" if
"used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
u.c.c. § 9-109(1) (1978).
54. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT ConE § 2-104(l)(c), 7 U.L.A. 634
(1985) (consumer credit sale is sale of goods, services or interest in land in
which "the goods, services or interest in land are purchased primarily for a personal, family, household or agricultural purposes").
55. The new act's scope is defined by reference to "consumer transactions"
which include "a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition
of an item of goods, a service, or an intangible [except securities] to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household." UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICE ACT§ 2(1), 7A U.L.A. § 234 (1985).
56. 15 u.s.c. § 2301(3) (1982).
57. Id. § 2301(1).
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the use [i.e., for personal household or family purposes]
of that type of product is not uncommon. The percentage of sales or the use to which a product is put by any
individual buyer is not determinative. For example,
products such as automobiles and typewriters which are
used for both personal and commercial purposes come
within the definition of consumer product. Where it is
unclear whether a particular product is covered under
the definition of consumer product, any ambiguity will
be resolved in favor of coverage. 58
In its discussion of agricultural machinery, structures, and
implements, the Commission again indicates that a use is "normal" unless it is "uncommon." 59 There may be dictionary justification for this construction, but to the authors it seems a
somewhat abnormal use of the word "normal." The justification
lies in the need to avoid, to the extent possible, any need for a
producer to furnish double packaging and description of the
same product for warranty purposes, since the producer quite
often must package before knowing the end use. But it does show
that Article 2 should be re-examined to avoid the appearance of a
warranty conflict as to those products not uncommonly used for
personal, household or family use, and amendment is needed to
give some understandable content to the concept of "duration"
of implied warranties.

c.

Disclaimer of Implied Warranties

Disclaimers of implied warranties under U.C.C. § 2-316(2) 60
have also been a source of problems. A disclaimer of a warranty
of merchantability or of fitness must be conspicuous, 61 but a disclaimer of all warranties with the use of words such as "as is" is
58. 16 C.F.R. § 700.l(a) (1985).
59. See id.§ 700.l(b) ("Agricultural products ... are not covered by the Act
where their personal, family, or household use is uncommon.").
60. Section 2-316(2) specifically provides:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicious, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be
by a writing and conspicious. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
u.c.c. § 2-316(2) (1978).
61. Id. For the full text of§ 2-316(2), see supra note 60.
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not explicitly required to be conspicuous. 62 The reason for this
distinction has escaped some courts, 63 and escapes the present
authors as well. Even commercial buyers could overlook "as is"
on the back of a printed form. In addition, under the MagnusonMoss Act, where there is a written warranty, implied warranties
may not be disclaimed 64-even if the buyer is, for example, a
buyer the size of DuPont & Company who agrees to the
disclaimer.
Many purely consumer-oriented, non-uniform amendments,65 and statutes not a part of the Code, 66 contain provisions
designed to prevent a disclaimer of implied warranties. If the de62. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1978). This subsection states:
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or
other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty;
Id.

63. In a typical expression of confusion, the court in Osborne v. Genevie made
the following observations:
However, we fail to see why the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial
Code would have felt that language such as "there are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof" had to be
conspicuous in order to be effective, and yet were willing to accept
words such as "as is" or "with all faults" as valid disclaimers when these
expressions were not conspicuous.
289 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). To remedy the apparent drafting
"slip," many courts have implied in U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) a "conspicuous" requirement. See, e.g., Osborne, 289 So. 2d at 23 ("as is" requirement must be set
forth in conspicuous manner); Fairchild Indus. v. Maritime Air Serv., Ltd., 274
Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975) (disclaimer such as "as is" or "with all faults"
must be conspicuous); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 NJ.
Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970) ("as is" disclaimer that was not clear with respect to its applicability did not disclaim implied warranty in sale of new semitrailers).
64. 15 u.s.c. § 2308 (1982).
65. Alabama's Code adds a provision to U.C.C. § 2-316 which makes the
section inapplicable to consumer goods. ALA. CODE § 7-2-316(5) (1975). This
section provides: "Nothing in subsection (2) or subsection (3)(a) or in section 72-317 shall be construed so as to limit or exclude the seller's liability for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods." Id. The District of
Columbia Code makes exclusion of implied warranties as to consumer goods
unenforceable. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-316.l (1981 & Supp. 1985). Maine's
§ 2-313(l)(b) adds a sentence reading: "In the case of consumer goods sold by
a merchant with respect to such goods, the description affirms that the goods are
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 2-313(l)(b) (1964 & Supp. 1985). Maryland's § 2-316 provides
that the section does not apply to consumer goods. Mo. CoM. LAw CODE ANN.
§ 2-316(1) (1975 & Supp. 1985). New Hampshire requires a separately signed
conspicuous writing for disclaimers of implied warranties. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 382-A-2:316(4) (1961 & Supp. 1983). Vermont also has this requirement. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(4) (1966 & Supp. 1985). Washington requires what
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cision is made to exclude consumer protections, then these nonCode statutes can be ignored, to the extent that the word "consumer" is defined to include only persons purchasing for personal, family or household purposes. The special consumer
amendments to Article 2 adopted by some states could then be
changed to statutes external to the Code, or consumer provisions
might be integrated into the Code in a harmonious fashion.
4.

Third Party Beneficiaries of a Seller's Warranties

Next, there is the question of the Code's coverage of what are
called third party beneficiaries of a seller's warranties. Here, the
developments in the law since the drafting stage of the Code have
rendered obsolete the three-tiered approach to the privity problem embodied in the 1956 adoption of three alternatives in
U.C.C. § 2-318. 67 But special treatment of the privity problem,
is not being warranted to be set forth with particularity. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 62A-2-316(4) (1966 & Supp. 1985).
66. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. CODE §§ 1790-1795.7 (West 1985) (Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act) (in particular § 1792.4). See also Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 421.101-428.104 (West 1974) (Wisconsin Consumer Act) (in particular
§ 421. l 06, which controls agreements to forego rights).
67. The three alternatives in U.C.C. § 2-318 provide:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home ifit is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury
to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
u.c.c. § 2-318 (1978).
Even a cursory survey of existing case law reveals that the alternative
adopted by a particular jurisdiction in no way establishes the parameters of privity law in that jurisdiction. Courts have been freely developing a common law of
privity which is best described as unpredictable and inconsistent. This is easily
explained by the fact that each alternative fails to address many frequently litigated privity issues.
Consider, for example, Alternative A, which is the law in most states. It is
silent on the need for vertical privity. The drafters have acknowledged its neutrality on this issue, making it clear that Alternative A was never "intended to

1986]

REVISION FOR ARTICLE

2

417

i.e., giving non-purchasers a warranty claim against either a seller
to the ultimate user or a remote seller, may not be appropriate in
view of products liability statutes 68 and section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts where a personal injury claim is involved. Conceivably, cases involving personal injury claims could be left to
other areas of the law while any loss of a purely "commercial" or
"economic" nature could be treated separately in the Code.69
Surely, the Code should not be interpreted as preempting all
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties,
given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain." U.C.C. § 9-318 comment 3 (1978).
Alternative B does eliminate the need for vertical privity, but does so only if
the plaintiff is "injured in person." It too is silent on the need for such privity if
the loss is economic.
Although absent from Alternative C is the "injury in person" language of
Alternative B, also absent is an express statement that economic loss is recoverable by a plaintiff lacking vertical privity. Given the failure of either Alternative
B or C to resolve this and other privity issues, and the existence of diverse case
law and commentary, thought should be given to a statutory cleansing of the
doctrine, or perhaps, anticipating the year 2000, to ending its role in the area of
warranty law. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 11-8, at 411 (2d ed. 1980) ("It is possible that
lack of privity as a defense to a cause of action will be only a historic relic in the
year 2000. It is a doctrine in hasty retreat .... ").
68. See ALA. CODE§§ 6-5-501 to -525 (Supp. 1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-681 to -686 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2801 to -2807 (Supp. 1985);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-401 to -406 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52572m to -572r (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11 (1982); IDAHO CODE,
§§ 6-1401 to -1409 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213 (Smith-Hurd
1984); IND. CODE ANN.§ 33-1-1.5-1 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 603301 to -3306 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 411.300-.340 (1978); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 14-221 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2945 (Supp. 1975);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 544.41, 604.02-.04 (Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 2521, -180 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 507-D:l to-D:5 (1983) (held unconstitutional in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983));
N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 99B-l to B-10 (1979 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 2801.1-01 to .1-07 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 30.900-.925 (1983); s.c. CODE
ANN.§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.§ 20-9-10
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 29-28-101 to -108 (1980 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE
ANN.§ 78-15-1 to -6 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 7.72.010 to .040 (Supp.
1985). See also Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 705 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Sixth Circuit applied response of Michigan Supreme Court that Michigan's
products liability act preempted all other liability for defective products).
69. The issue of whether strict liability in tort should extend to economic
loss has prompted no small volume of judicial debate. The vast majority of
courts that have considered the question have not permitted recovery for economic loss under strict liability. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548
P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976) (strict liability did not extend to buyers of mobile homes
who suffered economic loss); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d
145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (strict liability in tort applicable to physical injuries
and not to economic loss). For perhaps the leading case favoring such an extension to economic loss, see Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965) (strict liability in tort action maintained although plaintiff's
damage was limited to loss of defective carpeting).
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products liability suits in tort against sellers of goods. 70
The elimination of personal injury claims from warranty liability is desirable as it will annul the sympathy factor in the interpretation of warranty disclaimers and limitations of damages
clauses. We suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court, 71 and
perhaps other courts, were incorrect in holding that the Code
prevents a court from adopting the strict liability rule of section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, at least for personal injury
cases.
What is needed is a clear legislative delineation of the boundaries for warranty law and tort law, or, in the alternative, a consolidation of the two. Several alternatives should be considered. In
the first place, it will be necessary to determine what is meant by
"commercial" or "economic" loss. Should commercial loss include loss of salary, commissions, business, or other compensation resulting from personal injuries? Or, should these be
remitted to personal injury law? If the latter approach is selected,
then the Code warranty law could cover consequential economic
damages, 72 such as a loss of sales caused by the dysfunction of a
product that was not as warranted, but without the overtones of a
personal injury suit. The issue in such a case would be how far up
the chain of distribution, and how wide horizontally, to extend
liability. Seemingly, an abolition of privity should allow recovery
all the way, including loss of profits, by a person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods,
and who is injured as a result of the breach of the warranty.
Further complications could be caused by the passage of
United States Senate Bill 100, which provides for liability for
70. But see Cline v. Prowler Indus., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 980 (Del. 1980) ("In
view of ... the lack of adequate justification for the separate existence of a tort
remedy apart from the Code in sales transactions, we conclude that the General
Assembly did not intend to permit the adoption of a competing theory of liability in cases involving the sales of goods and, thus, preempted the field."). For a
further discussion of the Cline case, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
71. See Cline v. Prowler Indus., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 980 (Del. 1980). In
Cline, the plaintiff purchased a travel-trailer that was heated by a propane heater.
When the plaintiff turned on the propane heater, the unit exploded, causing
personal injuries to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the
heating unit under theories of breach of warranty and strict liability in tort.
However, the trialjudge refused to instruct the jury on the strict liability theory.
Id. at 970. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's
decision, holding that the Uniform Commercial Code had preempted the sales
field and, therefore, was the plaintiff's sole recourse for recovery. Id. at 980.
72. The classic example of consequential damages is loss of profits. The
coverage would be in addition to recovery of the diminution in value of the
product.
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breach of an express warranty73 and has its own rules for liability
in the absence of such a warranty. 74 The bill purports, under the
federal commerce clause, to preempt state laws, and to replace
the "strict liability" rules of state law. 75 Since warranty liability is
construed to be strict liability, an issue arises as to whether the
federal statute, if enacted, or the similar state statutes, also preempt the implied warranties of the Code or merely supplement
them.
5.

Notice to Sellers

Again, on the topic of warranties, mention should be made of
U.C.C. § 2-607(3), 76 which bars any remedy if a buyer does not
73. S. 100, 99th Cong., lst Sess. §§ 7, 8(a)(2) (1985). Section 7 of S. 100
specifically provides:
(a) A product is unreasonably dangerous because it did not conform to
an express warranty made by the manufacturer if(l) the product failed to conform to such warranty; and
(2) the failure of the product to conform to such warranty caused
the claimant's harm.
(b) A product may be unreasonably dangerous for failure to conform
to an express warranty although the manufacturer did not engage
in negligent or fraudulent conduct in making the express warranty.
Id.§ 7.
Section 8(a)(2) of S. 100 specifically provides:
(a) In any product liability action, a product seller other than a manufacturer is liable to a claimant, if the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that(2) (A) the product seller made an express warranty, independent
of any express warranty made by a manufacturer as to the
same product;
(B) the product failed to conform to such warranty; and
(C) the failure of the product to conform to such warranty
caused the claimant's harm.
Id. § 8(a)(2).
74. Id. §§ 4-6, 8.
75. Id. § 3(b)(l). Section 3(b)(l) specifically provides:
(b)(l) This Act supersedes any State law regarding recovery for any
loss or damage caused by a product to the extent that this Act establishes a rule of law applicable to any civil action brought against a manufacturer or product seller for loss or damage caused by a product,
including any action which before the effective date of this Act would
have been based on: (A) strict or absolute liability in tort;
(B) negligence or gross negligence; (C) breach of express or implied
warranty; (D) failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct; or (E) any
other theory that is the basis for an award for damages for loss or damage caused by a product. Any issue arising in such action that is not
governed by any such rule of law shall be governed by applicable State
law. This Act shall not be construed to waive or affect any defense of
sovereign immunity asserted in any State under any provision of law.
Id.

76. Section 2-607(3) provides:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
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notify the seller of any breach where a tender has been accepted.
Maine and South Carolina have amended the section to preclude
its application to suits for personal injuries. 77 Caselaw is divided
on the issue of notice of breach in two areas: first, whether notice
must be given by the aggrieved party to a remote seller; 78 and
second, whether notice must be given when the suit is by one
claiming third party beneficiary status under U.C.C. § 2-318 or
otherwise. 79
The problem of notice to a remote manufacturer is illustrated by the recent case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 80
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or
be barred from any remedy; and
(b) ifthe claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection (3) of
Section 2-312) and the buyer is sued as a result of such a breach
he must so notify the seller within a reasonable time after he
receives notice of the litigation or be barred from any remedy
over for liability established by the litigation.
u.c.c. § 2-607(3) (1978).
77. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-607(7) (1964 & Supp. 1985) (notice
requirement not applicable to personal injury); S.C. ConE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (requiring no notice of personal injury to seller of consumer
goods).
78. For cases holding that notice to a remote seller is not required, see
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978); Piercefield v. Remington
Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Vintage Homes, Inc. v.
Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). For cases holding that notice
is required, see Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Western Equip. Co. v.
Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980). Those courts willing to
excuse notice to a remote seller have done so on the questionable ground that
the term "seller" in U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) should be read as "the immediate
seller." For the full text of§ 2-607, see supra note 76.
79. The overwhelming majority of courts hold that warranty beneficiaries
need not give notice. See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala.
1979) (claimant who contracted silicosis due to defective sandblasting hoods
supplied by employer not required to give notice to manufacturer); Chaffin v.
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 194 S.E.2d 513 (1972) (notice provisions did not apply to soft drink buyer's mother who was injured after
consuming soap-like substance in soft drink which daughter gave her); Mattos v.
Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993 (1977) (repairman injured by faulty clamp not
required to give same notice within reasonable time after accident that his employer would have been required to give had any of his property been damaged).
But see Parrillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d 1313 (R.I. 1981) (bartender injured by
exploding bottle of grenadine required to give notice to defendant manufacturer
within reasonable time). The cases holding that notice is not required have
taken § 2-607(3)(a)'s use of the word "buyer" literally, disregarding the comment's suggestion that "the reason of the section does extend to requiring the
beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred." U.C.C. § 2-607
comment 5 (1978). For the full text of§ 2-607(3), see supra note 76.
80. 53 Md. App. 106, 452 A.2d 192 (1982), ajf'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d
930 (1983).
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where a remote manufacturer was not given notice of a breach of
warranty within a reasonable time. 81 A majority of the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals followed what they conceived to be the
majority view that direct notice is not necessary. 82 What is required is that each buyer in the chain of distribution notify its
seller in order to preserve the right to indemnity. 83 We believe
this concept would work if the final user and each prior seller was
limited to suit against the next prior seller in the chain of distribution. This theory has difficulties, however, when the end user
sues only a remote manufacturer.
The concurrence in Firestone focused on two changes that
make a "no direct notice" rule no longer viable. First, the rather
widespread use of the direct suit permits a buyer to drop his immediate seller from the suit or not even sue that seller at all. 84
Second, without prompt notice, a remote manufacturer may be
unable to obtain access to the remains of the product causing the
damage so as to build a defense of, for example, faulty installation
by the immediate seller. 85 Thus, the situation in Firestone suggests
that the local seller may have a conflict of interest with the manufacturer, and, consequently, as a litigation decision, may fail to
give notice before suit. 86 Both points, however, were rejected by
the majority.
One proposed justification for a rule excusing notice to parties with whom the buyer has not dealt is that the identity of the
remote manufacturer may be unknown. We suggest that whenever this is true, the courts can and should rule that the reason81. In Firestone, a truck driver purchased a tire for one of his tractors from
Elliott Equipment Company. Elliott received this tire through a chain of distributors. However, the tire was manufactured by Firestone. 53 Md. App. at 107,
452 A.2d at 193. While the tractor was hauling a trailer in Arizona, the tire
"blew out," causing the tractor to cross a median strip and collide with two
trees. Id. at 108, 452 A.2d at 193. The accident caused extensive damage to the
trailer and lost profits to the owner because of his inability to use the tractor. Id.
82. Id. at 118, 452 A.2d at 198.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 121-22, 452 A.2d at 200 (Lowe,J., concurring). One impediment
to such a suit was effectively removed by dictum in the Supreme Court's decision
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In WorldWide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court stated that a "forum State does not exceed
its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state." Id. at
297-98. In light of this statement, it would be a rare case where a jurisdictional
defense is available to an out-of-state manufacturer.
85. 53 Md. App. at 121-22, 452 A.2d at 200 (Lowe,J., concurring).
86. Id.
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able time for notice does not start to run until the manufacturer's
identity is discovered. But in the case of many products, as was
true in Firestone, the name of the manufacturer is on the product
or on the package. In fact, quite often the purchase is the result
of direct advertising by the manufacturer. In that case, the reasonable time should run from the discovery of the defect. Suits
against a remote manufacturer of a component part, however,
present a different picture and could be handled, if necessary, by
a rule requiring notice within a reasonable time after learning of
the manufacturer's identity.
Additionally, any revision of Article 2 should consider a
change in the penalty for a failure to give notice from an absolute
bar of "any remedy" to a bar conditioned on a showing of some
prejudice from the failure to receive notice, as is done in Article
4. 87 We advocate a further qualification. Where, in fact, the ultimate user's immediate seller gives an upstream notice, such notice should act to protect the user who did not give notice. But
some guidelines to this result should appear in the statute.
We believe that the non-uniform amendments to U.C.C. § 2607(3) by Maine and South Carolina88 are based on the harshness
of the complete bar rule presently found in the uniform text. If
our suggestion regarding the effect of a failure to give notice is
adopted, the need for the Maine and South Carolina amendments
largely disappears.
B.

The Battle of the Forms

Turning from warranties, where state variations and ad hoc
statutes are numerous, we find an area which, despite the absence
of any statutory variations (except in Montana), 89 and, so far as
87. See U.C.C. § 4-207(4), 4-406(2)(a) (1978). Section 4-207(4) specifically
provides: "Unless a claim for breach of warranty under this section is made
within a reasonable time after the person claiming learns of the breach, the person liable is discharged to the extent of any loss caused by the delay in making
claim." U.C.C. § 4-207(4) (1978).
Section 4-406(2)(a) specifically provides:
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an
item to comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (l) the customer is precluded from asserting against the bank
(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the
bank also establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such
failure;
Id. § 4-406(2)(a).
88. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
89. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 30-2-207 (1985).
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we are aware, of any special statutes, has spawned much litigation
and discussion in legal periodicals. 90 U.C.C. § 2-207 91 was once
introduced to a continuing legal education audience as follows:
[O]ne of the problems in this field, which has always
been the delight of law professors-for all I know the
delight of law students-is the so-called battle of the
forms where seller and buyer, each dedicated to his own
brand of insanity, exchange forms which have nothing to
do with each other and then ask counsel, "Well, where
are we?" That was a problem that Professor Llewellyn
dearly loved, and he put a long section in Article 2 which
has been generally hailed by the academic community as
nothing less than Magna Carta and, as far as I can tell,
generally hailed by members of the bar as probably the
end of civilization as we know it. 9 2
90. Some of the more recent commentary on § 2-207 can be found in Baird
& Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207,
68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982); Duesenberg, Contract Creation: The Continuing Struggle
with Additional and Different Terms under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207, 34
Bus. LAw. 1477 (1979); Gedid, A Background to Variance Problems Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Toward a Contextual Approach, 22 DuQ.. L. REV. 595 (1984); Murray, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 597 (1978); Shanker, Contract by Disagreement!?
(Reflections on U.C.C. 2-207), 81 CoM. LJ. 453 (1976); Taylor, U.C.C. Section 2207: An Integration of Legal Abstractions and Transactional Reality, 46 CIN. L. REV.
419 (1977); Thatcher, Battle of the Forms: Solution by Revision of Section 2-207, 16
U.C.C. L.J. 237 (1984); Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207, 33 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 327 (1983).
91. The current version of§ 2-207 provides:
( l) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition
to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
u.c.c. § 2-207 (1978).
92. P.F. CoocAN, G.T. DuNNE, E.A. FARNSWORTH, G. GILMORE, W.E. HoGAN, H. KRIPKE, F. LEARY, jR. & H. SACHSE, ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF
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Professor Gilmore's statement about the academic community
has not continued to be true. Many articles criticizing the section
have been written since those words were uttered. One of the
more recent articles states:
To say that Section 2-207 is no model of simplicity or
clarity would be to understate the matter considerably.
The judicial opinions and scholarly commentary document an ongoing struggle to comprehend an unnecessarily complex and opaque statute. To the extent that
Section 2-207 improves only marginally upon the common-law rules governing contract formation and content
it was intended to displace or qualify, enactment of the
statute has actually impeded modernization of the law
governing commercial transactions. By ignoring evidence of the parties' agreement other than their formal
expressions, the statute has discouraged the expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties.9!1
One reason for the difficulty with section 2-207 may well be
the failure of courts and commentators to consider Article 2's
contract provisions as a whole. U.C.C. § 2-207 was designed to
set express terms where both parties use differing express terms.
It was not meant to supplant the use of custom, course of dealing,
etc., where there are no conflicting express terms. Another reason may be a failure to realize how very limited a function the
section was originally intended to perform prior to Supplement
No. 1 and the 1956 amendments to Article 2.94
STUDY ON BANKING AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 108 (Feb. 1-4, 1968) [hereinafter cited as P.F. CooGAN].
93. Thatcher, supra note 90, at 239-40 (footnotes omitted).
94. The text of§ 2-207 of the May 1949 Draft read:
Section 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confinnation.
Where either a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time states terms
additional to those offered or agreed upon
(a) the additional terms are to be construed as proposal [sic] for
modification or addition; and
(b) between merchants the additional terms become part of the contract unless they materially alter it or notice of objection to them is
given within a reasonable time after they are received.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (May 1949 Draft).
In the Spring 1950 Draft, there was little change except that the former
preamble became subsection l, which then read: "A definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to those
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One issue under pre-Code law was the unnoticed counteroffer that would constitute a rejection of the offer. 95 Even at comoffers or agreed upon." U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950)
(emphasis added). The previous (a) and (b) became one sentence joined by
"and" in subsection (2). Also, the necessary "s" was added to "proposal" and
"modification or" was eliminated. See id.
The interesting question is how a "written confirmation" of an already completed deal can operate as an acceptance, although it could also operate as a
proposal "for modification" which, if agreed to, requires no consideration by
virtue of§ 2-209(1). Actually every proposal for modification is, in one sense, a
proposal for addition even if it merely adds a "not" to a prior term. The modification wording, however, remained eliminated.
The Spring 1951 Draft made no change, but in the November 1951 Draft
the words "or different from" reared their ugly heads in subsection (l) but not
in (2), and the "objection" in subsection (2) was changed so it could be either
"already given" or "given within a reasonable time." See U.C.C. § 2-207 (Final
Text Edition, Nov. 1951). For the full text of the current version ofU.C.C. § 2207, see supra note 91. Fuel for subsequent misunderstanding is furnished because in comment 3 the phrase "whether or not additional terms will become
part of the contract. . ." becomes "whether or not additional or different
terms .... " See U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 3 (1978) (emphasis added).
Supplement No. l, dated January 1955, produced a very lengthy revision,
expanding the text from nine lines of type with two subsections to 44 lines of
type with six subsections. Many of the ideas now in § 2-207 surface here. Supplement No. l stated as its reason or the changes:
In order to make the battle of the forms rule work in a business sense,
there first has to be a distinction drawn between offers which contain
form clauses and those which do not, and, secondly, the conflict of
forms must be arranged in a business-like way when the parties are
clearly engaged in a deal even though the form situation has not yet
been clearly ironed out.
U.C.C. § 2-207, at 7 (Supplement No. l to 1952 Draft).
Finally, the present wording appears in the 1956 recommendations as a
change to the 1952 wording with the following laconic comment: "The section
was entirely rewritten in Supp. No. l, and was later redrawn in a special supplement to express more clearly what was intended." U.C.C. § 2-207 (1956 Recommendations to the Editorial Board). Since the distinction between offers
which contain form clauses and those which do not, made in Supplement No. l,
was omitted, the thinking must have changed so that both were to receive the
same treatment.
95. See, e.g., In re Marcalus Mfg. Co., 120 F. Supp. 784 (D. NJ. 1954) (where
offeree's response did not conform to offer, it was not unequivocal acceptance of
offer but counter-offer); Riverside Coal Co. v. Elman Coal Co., 114 Conn. 492,
159 A. 280 ( 1932) (where wholesaler's confirmation of oral order for coal taken
by salesman contained provisions not embodied in order, wholesaler's confirmation was "counter proposal"); Aluminum Prod. Co. v. Regal Apparel Co., 296
Mass. 84, 4 N.E.2d 1003 (1936) (where defendant ordered goods from principal/plaintiff through agent and plaintiff tendered goods to defendant with bill in
its own name, there was notice that plaintiff was not acting as principal in contract with the agent but rather was making counter-offer); Johnson v. M. ].
O'Neill, Inc., 182 Minn. 232, 234 N.W. 16 (1931) (where offeree includes new
condition or additional requirement not included in offer, no contract results);
Poe! v. Brunswicke-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915)
(proposal to accept offer, if modified, is equivalent to rejection); Howells v.
Strooct, 50 A.D. 344, 63 N.Y.S. 1074 (App. Div. 1900) (where defendants wrote
and offered certain cloth and asked for notice of acceptance or rejection by re-
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mon law, it was possible to accept an offer and at the same time
request modifications. As stated in A Study of the Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Minnesota Law, the counter-offer construction at common law does not apply "if the acceptance is definite
and clearly indicates that the additional terms are merely 'suggestions' for modifications and not conditions." 96 In other words, at
common law you were making a counter-offer unless you made it
very clear that you were not.
Subsection (1) ofU.C.C. § 2-207 was intended to reverse that
approach. When properly analyzed, its effect is that you are mak. ing a proposal for modifications when your timely reply to an offer states your acceptance but also states terms and conditions
which vary from those of the offer. The "unless" clause, added in
amendments prior to 195697 and emphasized in the 1956 Report,
preserves freedom of contract for offerees by providing that a
counter-offer can be made if the offeree clearly so provides.
Where a form uses a definite expression of acceptance, the result
of the Code can be restated as providing, "If you do not mean
what you say, you should say so." The method of saying so is to
"expressly" make the statement of acceptance conditional on the
offeror's acceptance of the additional or different terms.
The Second Restatement of Contracts, in sections 5998 and 61, 99
turn mail, no contract of sale when plaintiff replied that they had submitted offer
to mill since defendant's letter required unqualified acceptance; thus plaintiff's
letter was counter-offer); Stanley v. Gannon, 109 Misc. 611, 180 N.Y.S. 602
(Sup. Ct. 1919) (requiring exact match on every detail for contract to be
formed); Crown v. Goldsboro, 182 N.C. 217, 108 S.E. 735 (1921) (requiring
meeting of the minds on every detail). But see Gedid, supra note 90, at 612 (suggesting that the "last shot" doctrine may not have been as pervasive as is generally considered). On the other hand, see Slawson, The New Meaning of Contracts:
The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITI. L. REV. 21, 58-60
( 1984) (drafting instructions to corporate clients). Leland L. Bull, Jr., prefers
the longer Supplement No. l version. Bull, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2207: More to the "Battle of the Forms," MICH. BJ. 536 (1983).
96. See HINYON AND McCLURE, A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE ON MINNESOTA LAw (1964). The authors state:
The effect of this subsection is that additional terms in a purported
acceptance are presumed to be mere requests for modification unless
expressly made conditions, whereas present caselaw presumes that they
are conditions and a rejection of the offer unless expressly made as requests or suggestions. The U.C.C. thus changes the presumption of
intent as to the effect of additional terms in an acceptance when not
expressly indicated.
Id. at 68-69.
97. For a reference to Supplement No. l to the 1952 Draft, where the "unless" clause first appeared, see supra note 94.
98. Section 59 reads: "A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is
conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those
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comes close to conforming to U.C.C. § 2-207(1), which is cited in
the comments to those sections. However, the black letter language does not give, in the present authors' opinion, as clear an
indication of the line of departure from the common law approach of Poel v. Brnnswick-Balke-Collendar 100 type cases as does
the Code, if, indeed, the Restatement intends any departure.
Arguably, under the Restatement formulations, with the emphasis on unequivocal acceptance for a contract to be formed,
there can be no additional or different terms. Section 59 refers to
a response "which purports to accept ... but is conditional on the
offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those offered,"101 not as an acceptance but as a counter-offer. Section 61
refers to an acceptance "which requests a change or addition to
the terms of the offer." 102 But there is no guide to separate "conditional" from "request."
It seems as if the Restatement assumes that every party negotiates a contract of sale. It does not meet head-on the somewhat
exaggerated but essentially accurate account of business form
contracting as stated in 1967 by Grant Gilmore and quoted
above. 103 A proper commercial code should address the case
where each form states terms and conditions with neither an express requirement of consent thereto nor any precatory language
offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 59 (1981).
99. Section 61 provides: "An acceptance which requests a change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is
made to depend on an assent to the changed or added terms." Id. § 61 (1981)
(emphasis added).
The comment states that "[a]n acceptance must be unequivocal." Id. § 61
comment a. The illustrations given use precatory language which makes the distinction between "request" and "condition" quite easy. The final clause in the
comment calls for treatment as an acceptance "unless, if fairly interpreted, the
offeree's assent depends on the offeror's further acquiescence in the modification." Id. The difficulty is that, given the common law background, courts will,
as does the woman of fable, "give the same opinion still," as to when a counteroffer is made. Also the Restatement is not very helpful in determining when there
is a "condition" to acceptance.
100. 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915) (proposal to accept offer if modified is equivalent to rejection). Cf Kurio v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 42, 6667 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (acceptance which attempts to restate terms of offer must be
accurate in every material respect); Maddox v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 259 F.
Supp. 781 (W.D. Okla. 1966) (for binding contract, acceptance must be absolute, unconditional, and identical with terms of offer).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 59 (1981). For the full text
of§ 59, see supra note 98.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 61 (1981). For the full text
of § 61, see supra note 99.
103. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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seeking modifications. Under the Restatement, the common law result will be that in the event of a price change before shipment,
either party can examine the papers and walk away from the
deal. 104 In the event of a shipment after an exchange of forms,
under the Restatement, the piece of paper last sent would seem to
govern.
What, in substance, U.C.C. § 2-207 attempts to do is to preserve each party's freedom to contract on two levels. One is to
allow an offeror to say, "My terms, or I won't play," and assumes
the offeree will accept or reject as offered. On the same level, the
Code allows the acceptor to say, "You must accept my counteroffer or I won't play," where the offeror has said nothing. But
two other situations can occur on the second level. Suppose
neither party makes the appropriate manifestation in its paper of
"My terms or I won't play" (the "neither" case), or suppose each
so manifests, as would happen if each followed the usually suggested forms (the "each" case). What then?
In the "neither" case, U.C.C. § 2-207(2) treats the "additional terms" in the second form as proposals for addition to the
contract which, unless both parties are merchants, will not become part of the contract unless the party firing the first shot consents. Whoever sends a paper in response to an offer stating in it
"We accept" has a contract on the offeror's terms and must press
for modification whether its terms be "different" or
"additional." 105
Where the contract is between merchants, however, the party
firing the first shot in our "neither" case, (if its purchasing personnel read the purported acceptor's terms or are otherwise
aware of them) has three options. The party can accept the proposals for addition or modification; it can object to them; or it can
decide that they are material changes, hence not a part of the contract, and do nothing, hoping it is right. If the merchant chooses
this third option and is right, the terms are not part of the contract. If he is wrong, the terms are part of the contract unless they
104. At least this seems to be the result if"no contract" results. There are
· a number of grounds on which courts could avoid the extreme rigors of the
"mirror image" rule. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 90, at 1231-37; Annot. 3
A.L.R.2d 257 (l 949). But, perhaps this only leads us to a three-tier classification
of additional or different terms, i.e. trivial, minor and material. The trouble
arises with the need to distinguish between minor and material clauses.
105. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1), (2) (1978). A proposal for modification still
requires mutual assent under the U.C.C. where the proposal is not "between
merchants." U.C.C. § 2-209(1) only eliminates the "independent consideration" requirement. See id. § 2-209(1).
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are "different" as opposed to "additional." Where both of the
parties' papers have provisions on the same subject, then the
terms of the first to fire should be considered objections to the
"different" terms of the other, under U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c). In
some courts they have been. io6
On this point there is a clear need for revision either to eliminate the additional-different dichotomy or to give guidance in determining which is which. This is particularly needed where the
Code supplies terms when there is no statement of them by the
parties, as in the case of implied warranties. Where the offer is
silent as to warranties, are the Code's "silent" terms part of the
offer? 107 Is a response on the warranty issue, where the offer is
silent, to be considered "additional" or "different"? Is there to
be a difference depending on the answer to the last question?
Now suppose we have both an offer with a term limiting all
acceptances to its terms, and an expression of acceptance with
additional or different terms. Even between merchants, the different and also the additional terms are mere proposals for modification. If the purported acceptance is also conditioned on
assent to its terms, we have the "each" case. The acceptance is a
counter-offer and one that limits subsequent acceptance to its
terms. In either case, the Code has not abolished the mirror image rule and the parties can thus insist on its application by the
use of appropriate language. In these cases where each party is
dedicated to its own brand of insanity, we should perhaps allow
them to stew in their own respective common law juices without a
contract, permitting each to walk away. 1os
But there is another situation-the oral contract followed by
a memorandum in confirmation which is sent usually by a seller,
but need not be. The oral contract will ordinarily be a bare bones
contract, with only a brand name, or other description, quantity,
price, and possibly a delivery term. If both parties have sent confirmation forms, do we treat the forms as agreed modifications
where they agree with each other and then apply U.C.C. § 2207 ( 1) and (2) 1og as if they were an offer and an expression of
106. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir.
1984) (analyzing three approaches).
107. The warranties would be in the contract if neither party referred to
warranties. Presumably, then, the implied warranties are terms of the offer, and
are accepted by an unqualified acceptance.
l 08. That is, of course, in the absence of further conduct which might trigger U.C.C. § 2-207(3), which we discuss later.
l 09. For the full text of U.C.C. § 2-207( l) and (2), see supra note 91.
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acceptance of a modification? Should not a more clearly defined
solution be expressed in the text?
What if the parties have exchanged papers which do not form
a contract, but nevertheless act as if there were one? We suspect
that the terms of U .C.C. § 2-207 (3) 110 are a bit broad. The section should not read "conduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of a contract," but rather "conduct by both parties
in performing the sale with respect to which they have exchanged
writings." If no writings are exchanged, or if there is only one
party's unaccepted writing, then U.C.C. § 2-204(1) 111 governs
and U.C.C. § 2-207(3) 112 is not needed, although the search for
"terms" under U.C.C. § 2-204(1) may reach the same result.
The requisite conduct, under U.C.C. § 2-207(3), should indicate that the parties are performing as if the specific writings exchanged had in fact made a contract, leaving only the
identification of the express terms. Then it is appropriate to provide that the contract consists of the terms on which the writings
agree. It then becomes necessary to fill in all gaps where express
terms are needed to provide the court with "a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy." 113 It is here that the
Code formulation may be considered to be too rigid in some
cases but quite appropriate in others. Whether the appropriateness relates primarily to off-the-shelf sales is itself an issue. Specifically manufactured goods with periodic payments do not fit
within Code formulations for finding terms at all. 114
I IO. For the full text of U.C.C. § 2-207(3), see supra note 91.
l l l. Section 2-204(1) specifically states: "A contract for sale of goods may
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." U.C.C. § 2-204(1)
(1978).
112. For the full text ofU.C.C. § 2-207(3), see supra note 91.
113. u.c.c. § 2-204(3) (l 978).
114. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., 321 Pa. Super. 357,
468 A.2d 748 (1983), ajf'd by necessity (2-2), 507 Pa. 88, 488 A.2d 581 (1985). In
Litton, a seven-judge panel of the Superior Court reversed (4-3) the prior decision ofa three-judge panel. See 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1091 (1982)
(original superior court decision will now not be officially reported). The threejudge panel in a split decision (2-1) had reversed the trial judge who had found
"no contract." In all, eight judges voted in the Superior Court (4-4), as one
judge on the original panel had retired before the "en bane" review, but the
other two sat. Because only four judges sat in the Supreme Court, the total of all
appellate court judges split evenly (6-6). In 1985, it was, therefore, the trial
judge's June 6, 1979 decision of "no contract" that broke the ties.
The case involved an alleged binding option to build up to five additional
1,000 foot self-unloading ore vessels. 321 Pa. Super. at 360, 468 A.2d at 749.
The problem was, according to the trial judge, a failure to agree on an escalation
clause to be applied on a quarterly basis to the quarterly progress payments. Id.

1986]

REVISION FOR ARTICLE

2

431

In going for the "fill-ins," we perhaps must distinguish between two sets of cases. One set of cases concerns the gap created where one party uses a term for which there is a Code gap
filler, either consistent with or different from the formulation in
the gap filler, and the other party has no term on the issue or a
contradictory term. The second set involves cases in which the
term crucial to the dispute was used by one party, while the other
party's writings are either silent on the point or contradict the
first party's terms, and the Code does not supply a gap filler on
point.
In our first set of cases, in which one party uses the Code
formulation and the other is silent, we can either construe the
other party's silence as impliedly including the Code formulation
so that the writings agree, or we can reach the same result by canceling both terms and inserting the Code provision. But where
one party uses a formulation that differs from the "gap filler" formulation and the other either uses the Code formulation, or is
silent, what happens? Where the Code formulation is used by
either party and the other uses a different formulation, we have an
express disagreement and, strictly following the language of
U.C.C. § 2-207(3), 115 the Code formulation applies. If any reference to a term in the one party's document is absent from the
other party's form, should we not again include the Code term by
implication in the silent document, therefore creating an inconsistency which mandates use of the gap filler?
Let us now add to the complexity by asking whether, in these
cases, we are following the intent of the parties? Isn't the intent
that is receiving recognition really only that of the party using the
Code formulation? Suppose one party uses a formulation that
gives a lesser warranty than that provided by the Code, but is consistent with an applicable trade usage. If the second party expressly uses the full Code formulation, under the literal language
of U.C.C. § 2-207(3), 116 that formulation appears to govern.
Contradictory terms are excised and then the Code moves in.
Although, under U.C.C. § 1-205(4), 117 express terms govern a usat 371, 468 A.2d at 755. "A reasonable price at the time of delivery" under
U.C.C. § 2-304(1), was obviously not desired by either party. Nor was it easy, as
one can see, to determine the intent of either party, hence, no contract.
115. For the full text of U.C.C. § 2-207(3), see supra note 91.
116. For the full text of U.C.C. § 2-207(3), see supra note 91.
117. Section 1-205(4) specifically provides:
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable
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age of trade, we do not have express terms of agreement here.
We are looking for terms to use in dispute resolution when there
is no mutually agreed stipulation. It is here that U.C.C. § 2-207
breaks down. We feel that any applicable usage of trade should
govern in subsection (3) cases rather than the Code formulation
in at least two situations. One is where both parties are silent.
The other situation is where one party's term uses the usage of
trade and the other party uses the full Code provision or is silent.
As further variation, suppose the buyer's offer specifies less
than the full scope of the Code warranty protection and the
seller's conditional expression of acceptance specifies even less.
For example, a buyer uses a limited remedy warranty of parts and
labor for replacement, and the seller's form, the second shot,
states the limited warranty recovery as "parts only." Both are
merchants. A literal application of U.C.C. § 2-207(3) would treat
these as different terms canceling each other, giving to the buyer
the full panoply of Code remedies. This is absurd, and should
not be the result. The doctrine of estoppel, 118 or something akin,
would support a ruling that the offeror could not be given more
protection than its form specified. But should there not be some
Code guidance for the courts? Also, it is possible to argue that
both parties' writings agreed on the concept of a limited replacement warranty and the only unagreed portion was who pays for
the labor. The common law's "last shot" solution, in our hypothetical, would favor the "parts only" seller. But if by chance the
"parts and labor" paper was last fired, then it would govern. Is
this situation a case where courts should be allowed to "split the
difference"? 11 9
Finally, if both parties are silent, or one specifies the usage of
express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and
course of dealing controls usage of trade.
u.c.c. § 1-205(4) (1978).
118. Section 1-103 authorizes the application of doctrines of estoppel, etc.,
to supplement Code provisions. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
119. See National Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965). In National Presto, Judge Davis said:
But it is unsatisfactory to tell a party who did not, either in terms or by
fair implication, assume a certain heavy risk that he alone must bear it
simply because of the happenstance that it fell to his lot. Particularly is
this so where, as here, the unexpected occurrence led to a period of
extra work which was not useless to the other party. It is at least
equally logical and decidedly more just to divide the cost between the
two parties, neither of whom can be properly charged with the whole.
338 F.2d at 111 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
When the parties exchanging conflicting forms (without realizing the conflict) go ahead and perform as if there were a contract, why not have a "split the
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trade and the other is silent, shouldn't the court find that the writings agree on the usage of trade? The usage must be considered
as "having such regularity of observance [in the business here involved] as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question." 120 That being the expectation that both parties had, or should have had, the silent party
should be given no more. The silence, in the writings, should be
construed as an expression of the expectation, not of the Code
term. The same approach should be taken if there is evidence of
a course of dealing. While we are of the opinion that such results
might be reached under the Code, out of an abundance of caution, we suggest that an amendment would be helpful.
One final point should be made. One should not expect too
much of the "between merchants" rule of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) as to
what becomes a part of the agreement. The rule is best stated in
the negative. Additional, and perhaps different terms, do not become part of the agreement if one of four scenarios is present.
The first is where the offer expressly requires a "no changes" acceptance. The second is where the offer has a term on the same
subject that is so different as to constitute an objection which "has
already been given" to the proposed change. The third is where
specific objection is given within a reasonable time after notice of
the term has been received. This scenario is not often played
because the usual situation is that each side looks only at the material typed in the blanks on the face of the other side's form and
then files it. The fourth and final scenario involves the additional
term which would materially "alter the contract." But what determines when "the contract" would be materially altered? 121 Here
three approaches are possible.
One approach could be called the surgical approach, namely,
"When in doubt, cut it out." Doubts as to "materiality" would be
resolved against inclusion of the term in the contract.
A second approach is the "significance" approach. Is the
term significantly different from what is usual and customary in
difference" rule? Why does the rule have to be all or nothing for one party?
Could not the conflict be considered analogous to an unexpected event?
120. u.c.c. § 1-205(2) (1978).
121. The concept of "materially altering the contract" is a bit difficult to
grasp when the issue is whether there is a contract. If the alteration is "material" to the first form sender, isn't it equally material to the second form sender?
If there has been no change of position, a "no contract" result may not be so
bad. But where further conduct screams "contract," a mere cancellation of the
material term and a ruling that the other party's terms constitute the contract
does not seem proper.
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the particular business? Clearly, it makes no difference if the dispute is not over compliance with the particular term. There is a
contract, and whether the disputed term is or is not a part of the
contract is irrelevant. Thus the use of the variation to reach a "no
contract" conclusion is prohibited. If we limit materiality to significant changes, that is, an "equity does not stop to pick up pins"
approach, we could avoid much litigation. 122 Perhaps we should
omit the "materiality" test altogether and substitute a rule that
between merchants the term becomes a part of the contract if it
states a trade custom or usage in whole or in part. This would aid
courts that might have difficulty in finding that the trade custom is
a silent term in every offer or acceptance. Such a rule would also,
we suspect, limit issues to the less vague question of the existence
of a trade custom rather than notions of materiality.
Lastly, the official comment uses a "surprise and hardship"
approach. For example, the comment treats a term for interest
on late payments as an immaterial change. In today's world of
122. Article 19 of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods provides:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains
additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer
and constitutes a counter-offer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance
but contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter
the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror,
without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a
notice to that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract
are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the
acceptance.
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the
price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of
delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other or the settlement of
disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GooDs, supra note 21, art. 19. The section is reprinted and discussed in J. HONNOLD, supra note 21, at 188-96. Under this approach, the scope of the rule is
reduced to conflicts in relatively minor terms. Conceivably, the approach is an
attempt to chart a line between "dickered" and "boiler-plate" terms after the
fashion of Karl Llewellyn. The trouble is, as Honnold says, "The only fact that
emerges is that both parties were paying no attention to the printed provision
on the other's forms." J. HONNOLD, supra note 21, at 195.
One might be tempted to say that the parties only consider as material that
which is to be filled out on the face of the forms. But we often find warranty
scope and arbitration or dispute settlement left to the "boiler-plate". Does the
volume of litigation of these items indicate materiality, or does the litigation
result because invited by the lack of precision in the law? Would not the better
search be for "trade practice" rather than Code "gap-fillers," as this would result, even in the case of "off-the-shelf" goods, in a much needed greater degree
of diversity from trade to trade. This may also be the lesson to be drawn from
the various non-uniform amendments to the warranty provisions of the U.C.C.
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inflation and high and rapidly fluctuating rates, 123 with lagging
rules on prejudgment interest, 1 2 4 there can be an extremely large
difference between the interest due under a prevailing statute and
that recoverable under a contract term.
In Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, 125 the rate which a majority of the Idaho Supreme Court, relying on the Code comment,
found to be a non-material alteration increased the recovery of
interest by 1,929% (from $1,400 to $27,000) over that recoverable had the interest statute been treated as a conflicting silent
term and thus applicable in the absence of an agreed term. 126 An
issue of interpretation could arise even under a silent term approach. Is the silent term the state's prejudgment interest law, or
is it the trade practice as to interest on overdue invoices? An
interest rate, applicable from the due date, could be considered as
limiting bargained-for credit if the bargain was for an interest-free
thirty, sixty, or ninety-day payment time, or if in the trade thirty,
sixty, or ninety-day credit was usually interest free, as in the old
"two percent ten days net thirty days" term. Here, in particular,
the suggested change from "materially alter" to "states a trade
123. For many years, the business loan rate was below six percent, the usual
statutory rate for prejudgment interest. For example, in 1950 the average rate
on business loans charged by banks in 19 large cities was rising from 2.6% to
2.84%. See 37 FED. RES. BULL. 304 (March 1951). In 1956, this same rate rose
from 3.93% to 4.38%. See 43 FED. REs. BULL. 53 Qan. 1957). Recently, the rate
has been as high as 20.14% in 1982. See Tables published by Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System in Federal Reserve Bulletin. While the trend
now is toward lower rates with the fourth quarter 1985 "prime" at 9.5%, see N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 22, the economic value of customary interest (which usually exceeds "prime") over the statutory rate is far greater than
it was when the comment was written or last considered in 1957, when customary interest rates were lower than statutory rates.
124. For two different suggestions on prejudgment interest, see, e.g., MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON PREJUDGMENT COMPENSATION ON
MONEY AWARDS: ALTERNATIVES TO INTEREST (Report No. 47) (1982); Keir &
Keir, Opportunity Cost: A Measure of Prejudgment Interest, 39 Bus. LAw. 129 ( 1983).
125. 104 Idaho 284, 658 P.2d 955 (1983). The court in Rangen also queried
as to whether oral notice of objection would be sufficient under U.C.C. § 2207(2)(c). Id. at 296, 658 P.2d at 964.
126. The comment to U.C.C. § 2-207 is not clear, in giving examples of
"clauses which involve no element of surprise" which are incorporated into the
contract absent objection. It includes: "a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices or fixing the seller's standard credit terms where they are within the
range of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for." U.C.C. § 2207 comment 5 (1978) (emphasis added). The antecedent of"they" appears to
be only "credit terms" in view of the "and" clause. Hence the comment does
not require increase on overdue invoices to be within the range of trade practice. Shouldn't it do so? Should not the statute itself have an "including but not
limited to" list of examples? For a comparison, see UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF Goons, supra note 21.
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usage or custom in whole or in part" would also avoid the obsolescence of the present prejudgment interest statutes.
Subsection (3) of U.C.C. § 2-207 could also stand a clearer
reference to custom and usage of trade as a prime source for gap
fillers. Such a source, in general, is far less apt to suffer from
obsolescence over time than "any supplementary terms" incorporated from express Code provisions. In addition, proof of trade
custom should be made easier by including not only written trade
codes similar to the "Worth Street Rules" for the cotton trade, 127
but also the provisions of form contracts negotiated between representatives of the selling trade and the buying trade. 128
We suggest that in any redrafting of U.C.C. § 2-207 it must
be assumed that the parties will not change their forms. Hence,
we do not concur with some suggested revisions which appear to
require changes. 129

C.

Remedies

1. Reclamation
Part 7 of Article 2 has its share of non-uniform amendments.130 One is a sort of an "amendment by omission" in
127. WORTH STREET RULES, STANDARD CorroN TEXTILE SALES NOTE (published by the Assoc. of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York, 40 Worth Street,
New York City).
128. See, e.g., International Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 380 Pa. 407,
110 A.2d 186 (1955) (standard forms covering sales between flour merchants
and bakers had sufficient blank space to insert quality description, hence seller
was spoofing buyer as to no changes permitted). The National Association of
Purchasing Agents has worked up forms for basic commodities. The National
Retail Dry Goods Association has published Basic Sales Provisions. In the
United States, cases like Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282
U.S. 30 (1930), have been thought to create antitrust problems. But if drafted
jointly by representatives of both sides with no penalty for non-adoption, perhaps a distinction exists.
At any rate, in European trade, jointly negotiated form contracts are not
unknown. Consider UNIFIN, 1959, adopted by the Timber Trade Federation of
the United Kingdom and the Finnish Sawmill Owner's Association, or
DUTCHFAS, 1952, adopted by the Timber Trade Association of Holland and
the Swedish Wood Exporters Association, discussed in 10 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAw, supra note 21.
In the computer-to-computer contracting of the future, we can envision a
complete purchase order stating a stock number (description including quality
term), quantity, shipping date, and "Terms NRDGA Standard A," incorporating
the provisions ofa National Retail Dry Goods standard set of terms for a particular commodity.
129. See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflections and
Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 171, 206-07 (1975); Thatcher, supra note 90, at
246-54.
130. Twenty-six states have non-uniform texts to U.C.C. § 2-702. See ALA.
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U.C.C. § 2-702(3) on reclamation of goods by an unpaid seller. 131
The proposed 1966 official amendments eliminated the words
"or lien creditor" as one whose intervening rights would take precedence over an unpaid seller's right of reclamation. 132 To date
only twenty-one states and the District of Columbia appear to
have adopted this amendment. 133
Non-uniformity has also resulted from the now famous case
CODE§ 7-2-702 (1984); ALASKA STAT.§ 45.02.702 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-2381 (1967); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-702 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2702 (1974); GA. CODE ANN.§ 11-2-702 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 490-2-702
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 28-2-702 (1980); KY. REV. STAT. § 355.2-702 (1972);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-702 (West 1958); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 440.2702 (West 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 400.2-702 (Vernon 1965); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 2-702 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 104.2702 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 382-A:2-702 (1961); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1302.76 (Page 1979); OR. REV.
STAT. § 72.7020 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6A-2-702 (1970); s.c. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-702 (Law Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 57A-2-702 (1980);
TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-2-702 (1979); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.702
(Vernon 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 704-2-702 (1985-86); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A,
§ 2-702 (1966); VA. CODE§ 8.2-702 (1965); w. VA. CODE§ 46-2-702 (1966).
Five have non-uniform texts to U.C.C. § 2-719. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-719
(1984); CAL. CoM. CoDE § 2719 (West 1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-719
(1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-719 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 62A.2719 (Supp. 1986).
Fourteen have amended U.C.C. § 2-725. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-725 (1984);
CAL. CoM. CODE§§ 2725, 2800-01 (West Supp. 1985); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2725 (1973); lowA CODE ANN. § 554.2725 (West 1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2-725 (Supp. 1984-85); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-725 (1972); OHIO REV.
CoDE ANN. § 1302.98 (Page Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. l2A, § 2-725
(West 1963); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 72.7250, 72.8010-.8200 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 6A-2-725 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 57A-2-725 (Supp. 1984); TENN. ConE ANN. § 47-2-725
(1979); Wis. STAT. § 402.725 (Supp. 1985). For further discussion of§ 2-725,
see infra note 162 and accompanying text. Although the bulk of Article 2's remedial provisions are located in Part 7, other provisions capable of being characterized as remedial can be found elsewhere. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-601 (1978)
(buyer's right to reject); id. § 2-608 (buyer's right to revoke acceptance).
13 l. Section 2-702(2) permits a seller to reclaim goods sold on credit to an
insolvent buyer if the conditions of the subsection are met. U.C.C. § 2-702(2)
(1978). Section 2-702(3) places a limitation on that right. It provides: "The
seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in
ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403).
Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to
them." Id.
132. The reason for the deletion of this language by the Permanent Editorial Board was to prevent the reclamation right from being subordinate to a
buyer's trustee in bankruptcy by virtue of his avoidance power as a lien creditor.
See, e.g., In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960) (seller's reclamation right
cannot prevail over trustee in bankruptcy).
133. The states reported as eliminating "or lien creditor" from their versions ofU.C.C. § 2-702(3) are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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of In re Samuels & Co., 134 which involved the respective rights of
unpaid sellers of cattle and a secured creditor (as a good faith
purchaser) who financed the inventory of the meat packer. 135
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting
en bane, reversed the decision of its panel, and held that due to
the after-acquired property clause in the security agreement, the
secured party attained the status of a good faith purchaser under
U.C.C. § 2-403(1), 136 and, hence, defeated the reclamation rights
of the sellers. 137
134. 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on rehearing en bane, 526 F.2d 1238
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). A prior decision in the case, at 483
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), was reversed as Stowers v. Mahon, 416 U.S. 100
(1975).
135. The livestock was delivered to the buyer on a "grade and yield" basis,
that is, the contract price was left open for a period of 24 hours until the Department of Agriculture graded the meat and determined the yield. Further, payment was made by check. The court concluded that the sales were "cash sales."
Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d at 146. The sellers' right of reclamation was, therefore,
grounded in U.C.C. § 2-507(2) ("Where payment is due and demanded on the
delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the
seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment
due.") and § 2-511(3) ("payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment") rather than
u.c.c. § 2-702.
136. Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 1243. Section 2-403(1) states in part:
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale" ....
U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978). The Code definition of"purchaser" includes persons
"taking by ... mortgage, pledge, lien ... or any other voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property." U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33) (1978), and is, as a
consequence, broad enough to encompass an Article 9 secured party. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 9-101 comment (1978) (distinctions among security devices will be
made on functional rather than formal grounds); id. § 9-102(2) (Article applies
to liens created by contract).
137. The court believed that this result was compelled by "[t]he Code's
overall plan, which typically favors good faith purchasers, and which encourages
notice filing of nonpossessory security interests in personalty through the imposition of stringent penalties for nonfiling .... " Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d at 124142) (appendix) (footnote omitted).
Because U.C.C. § 2-702(3) explicitly makes the right of reclamation under
that section subject to the interests of a good faith purchaser, the reasoning of
the Fifth Circuit would be equally applicable to the claim of a credit seller. See
526 F.2d at 1244-45.
In addition to the Samuels debacle, the American Beef Packers Company
filed in bankruptcy in January 1975, leaving livestock producers in 13 states unpaid for over $20 million worth of cattle. Prior to this the total due cattlemen
from 167 packer failures from 1958 to 1975 was $43 million, an average loss of
only $257,000 per failure. S. REP. No. 932, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976).
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Once the unpaid cattle sellers were shown the tenuous nature of their rights under U.C.C. § 2-507(2) and 2-702(2), they
secured a flurry of protective state statutes. 138 They also secured
a federal act specially amending the Packers and Stockyards Act.
The amendment, by use of a trust fund approach, provided what
was considered a better assurance of recovery. 139
Absent a written misrepresentation of solvency, section 2702 has a statutory time limit of ten days after receipt of the
goods by the buyer for notice of reclamation. 140 The comment to
U.C.C. § 2-507(2) attempts to apply the same ten-day period to
reclamations under that section. 141 A California court recently
refused to go along with what it called "attempted legislation by
comment." 142 Amendment may be needed to provide a workable
138. The cattle raisers pushed for new legislation in light of the size of the
American Beef Packers Company failure. Some state legislation was passed. See,
e.g., 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 772 (West); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1801 to -1802
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT.§§ 54-1801 to -1808 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 9138 to -139 (West Supp. 1984-85); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 148.021-.028
(Vernon 1982). But state-by-state progress was too slow, so a federal preemptive statute was obtained. Packers and Stockyards Act, Pub. L. No. 94-40, § 8, 90
Stat. 124a, 1251-52 (1976) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 196 (1982)). For a further
discussion of the preemptive statute, see infra note 139.
139. The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, as amended, received a new
§ 196, which provides in part:
(b) All livestock purchased by a packer in cash sales, and all inventories
of, or receivables or proceeds from meat, meatfood products, or livestock products derived therefrom, shall be held by such packer in trust
for the benefit of all unpaid cash sellers of such livestock until full payment has been received by such unpaid sellers ...
7 U.S.C. § 196 (1982) (emphasis added). Thus, the new section makes the
packer a trustee in a cash sale for the vendor, not only of the livestock, but of
proceeds. Also, the Act covers all livestock as defined in the Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, § 182, namely "cattle, sheep, swine, horses, mules, or goatswhether live or dead." 7 U.S.C. § 182(4) (1982). For additional background,
see S. REP. No. 932, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) and H.R. REP. No. 1391, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. l (1976). Livestock sellers lose the benefit of the trust if payment is not received within thirty days of its due date, or, if within fifteen days
after receipt of notice of dishonor of a payment instrument promptly presented,
written notice is not filed with the Secretary of Agriculture.
These provisions preempt the Code, 7 U.S.C. § 228(c) (1982), but interact
with the ten-day limit of§ 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(l)
(1985). For the text of section 546(c), see infra note 143.
140. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). The ten-day limit will not apply ifthe buyer
made a "misrepresentation of solvency ... to the particular seller in writing
within three months before delivery." Id.
14 l. Comment 3 to § 2-507 states: "The provision of this Article for a ten
day limit within which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an
insolvent buyer is also applicable here." U.C.C. § 2-507 comment 3 (1978).
Note that this obvious reference to U.C.C. § 2-702(2) is less than accurate. The
demand to reclaim, not the reclamation itself, must occur within the 10-day limit
established by that subsection. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2) comment 2 (1978).
142. See Citizens Bank of Roseville v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 191
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time limit. Note, however, the Bankruptcy Code has only the tenday limit and does not provide for an "out" where there is a written misrepresentation of solvency; 143 nor is it clear whether the
cash sale rule of U.C.C. § 2-507(2) 144 fits the new Bankruptcy
Code provision. 145
Statutory revisers are faced with two issues. 146 The first is
whether only unpaid cattle sellers should be relieved from the priority of the after-acquired property clauses of those financing a
buyer's inventory or whether other sellers should have the same
rights.1 47 The second is whether the ten-day limits of U.C.C. § 2Cal. Rptr. 729 (l 983). Other courts have also refused to impose a IO-day limit.
See, e.g., Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1980); Greater Louisville Auto
Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1965); In re Lindenbaum's,
Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964). However, the vast
majority have imposed a 10-day limit to claiming reclamations. See, e.g., Holiday
Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1983);
Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d l (1st Cir. 1980); Sorrels v. Texas Bank &
Trust Co., 597 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Va. 1968); Chapman Parts Warehouse, Inc. v. Guderian, 609 S.W.2d
317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
143. See l l U.S.C. § 546(c) (1985), which reads in part:
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the rights and
powers of a trustee under sections 544(a), 545, and 549 of this title are
subject to any statutory or common-law right of a seller of goods that
has sold goods to the debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's
business, to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such goods
while insolvent, but( l) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller demands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after receipt of such goods by the debtor ....
Id.

144. Section 2-507(2) specifically provides: "Where payment is due and
demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right
as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making
the payment due." U.C.C. § 2-507 (1978).
145. If it does fit, the fit is an uneasy one. Observe that the right granted by
U.C.C. § 2-507(2) is not dependent upon the buyer's insolvency, unlike the
Bankruptcy Code provision. See supra notes 143-44. Also, the U.C.C. definition
of insolvency differs from the Bankruptcy Code definition, as the U.C.C. adds
"has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business." Compare V.C.C.
§ 1-201(23) (1978) with 11U.S.C.§101(29) (1985).
146. Although we limit our discussion to two issues, there are others. For
example, does the reclamation right granted by either U.C.C. § 2-702(2) or
U.C.C. § 2-507(2) extend to proceeds from the resale of the goods by the buyer?
On this point, not all courts agree. Compare Jn re Coast Trading Co., 31 Bankr.
667 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982) (sellers have no claim to proceeds) with Ranchers &
Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 38 Colo. App. 69, 73-74, 552 P.2d
313, 317 (1976) (seller has claim to proceeds) and In re Central Islip Supermarkets, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (seller has
claim to proceeds).
147. For a discussion of cattle sellers' rights, see supra notes 134-39 and
accompanying text.
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207(2) and comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-507(2) should commence to
run from the receipt of the goods or from the discovery of
trouble. 148 If the normal situation is that there is about a threeor four-day delay in sending a check after delivery and another
two-day delay before the check is received and deposited, then
five or six of the ten days allowed have elapsed. Given a fivebusiness-day lapse after the seller deposits the check before the
seller can learn that the check has "bounced," but during which
the buyer's obligation is suspended, 149 there is little or no time in
which a seller may act, especially where weekends intervene.
Since the United States Supreme Court has held that a check
is not a representation of sufficient money in the bank for it to
clear, 150 the check cannot serve as the written representation of
solvency to extend the Code's useless ten-day period. 151 Where
bankruptcy has intervened, there can be no extension. The tenday limit is now in the relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code.1 52
It is entirely academic to say that sellers should get, every three
months, a written representation of solvency from those with
whom they deal. Perhaps the trust concept of section 206 of the
Packers and Stockyards Act could be adopted in the Code.1 53
Protection should, however, be accorded to buyers in the ordinary course of business, no matter what solution is adopted.
148. For a discussion of the 10-day limitation on unpaid sellers' reclamation rights, see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
149. See U.C.C. § 3-802 (1978) ("where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation . . . the obligation is suspended pro tanto . . . until its
presentment").
150. Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
151. A few courts have indicated a willingness to equate the giving of a
check with a representation of solvency provided the seller can show it relied on
the check. See In re Creative Bldgs., Inc., 498 F.2d l, 4 (7th Cir. 1974) (dictum)
(check could serve as "tacit representation" of solvency); In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co.,
22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 938 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1977) (dictum) (check can
comply with literal requirements of writing only if relied upon by seller as representation of solvency); Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 103 Ill.
App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968) (check can comply with literal
requirement ofa writing, i.e., in writing, addressed to particular seller and dated
within three months of delivery). All of these are prior to Williams, supra note
150.
152. For the text of the relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code, see supra
note 143.
153. For a discussion of the Packers and Stockyards Act trust concept, see
supra note 139 and accompanying text. The trust concept has been adopted in
several consignment of works of art statutes. For a discussion of the trust concept in consignment of works of art statutes, see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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2. Automotive Lemons
A second remedial area which has, in part, been rendered
non-uniform involves that progenitor of nightmares-the automotive lemon. In 1982, Connecticut became the first state to pass
what is descriptively called a "lemon law" relating to the purchase
of new automobiles. 154 At last count, thirty-four states had
adopted some form of this legislation. 155 Most of these acts do
not expressly supersede other relevant legislation, primarily
U.C.C. § 2-608 and the Magnuson-Moss Act. 156 Do they simply
154. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 42-179 (West Supp. 1985).
155. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.300 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 441261 to -1265 (Supp. 1984-1985); CAL. C1v. CooE § 1793.2 (West 1985); Cow.
REV. STAT. § 42-12-101 (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 42-179 (West Supp.
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-5009 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 681.10-.108 (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 4337-3.5 (Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 112, §§ 1201-1208 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IowA CooE
ANN.§ 322E.l (West Supp. 1985); Kv. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 367.860-.870 (BobbsMerrill Supp. 1984); 1984 LA. ACTS. 228; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 11611165 (Supp. 1984-1985); Mo. CoM. LAw CooE ANN. § 14-1501 (Supp. 1985);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 7N 1h (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325F.665 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.560 to .579 (Vernon
Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-501 to -507 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 60-2701 to -2709 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 598.151-.786 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 357-D (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-19 (West Supp.
1985); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 198-a (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-2-103(l)(d) (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.316-.375 (1983);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1951-1963 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.L GEN. LAws
§§ 31-5.2-1 to -13 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 55-23-101 to -105 (Supp.
1984); TEX. C1v. CODE ANN. § 4413(36) (Vernon Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, §§ 4174-4181 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE§§ 59.1-207 to .14 (Supp. 1985);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 19.118.010-.070 (Supp. 1985); w. VA. CODE§§ 46A6A-l to -9 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015 (West Supp. 1985); Wvo.
STAT.§ 640-17-101(Supp.1983). For a survey and comparison of the legislation adopted by the various states, see Honigman, The New "Lemon Laws": Expanding UCC Remedies, 17 U.C.C. LJ. 116 (1984).
Three states-Connecticut, Texas, and Vermont-have appointed arbitration boards whose decisions are effective against manufacturers without a stay
pending appeal, even though the boards' members include car dealers but not
manufacturers. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-181 to -182 (West Supp.
1985); TEX. C1v. CODE ANN.§ 4413(36)(12.03) (Vernon Supp. 1985); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4174, 4176 (1984).
In Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, No. A-83-CA 641 (W.D.
Tex. 1984), the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
held the Texas statute to be unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision as to those parts of Texas' lemon law held unconstitutional and affirmed where the district court ruled in favor of the statute. Chrysler Corp. v.
Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
156. One commentator suggests:
A consumer, for example, could sue the manufacturer for rescission
under a state's lemon law, the dealer for revocation of acceptance and
consequential damages under § 2-608 of the UCC, and both the dealer
and manufacturer for reasonable attorney fees under 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(d) of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
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add another arrow to the automobile purchaser's quiver? Will
they be interpreted as stating additional conditions precedent to
the exercise of the remedy of "revocation of acceptance"? Under
the lemon laws, if the breach of warranty is substantial and is not
timely remedied after a specified number of attempts, the manufacturer must either refund the purchase price or provide a new
vehicle. 157 But there is a common significant provision requiring
that the purchaser first exhaust any proper out-of-court settlement procedure established by the manufacturer before taking
the case to court. 15s
For our purposes, the "lemon laws" raise a fundamental
question relevant to the structure of a redrafted Article 2. Should
the rules of the game as to grounds for rescission be different for
different sorts of contracts or should they be the same without
regard to the underlying subject matter or identity of the players?
Should resort to alternative dispute resolution procedures, if
available, be a condition precedent to the use of the judicial system or would this be another expensive delay, causing consumer
claims to be abandoned?

3.

The "Lost Volume" Seller and Other Remedial Issues

In another area, there has been sufficient legal writing about
the "lost volume" seller 159 to justify a reconsideration of that isHonigman, supra note 155, at 119 n.21. The lemon laws of Illinois and Oregon
do, however, limit resort to other remedies. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 112,
§ 1205 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.375 ( 1983). Arizona has
amended U.C.C. § 2-608 to exclude from its scope new automobiles subject to
its lemon law. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 47-2608(0) (Supp. 1984). It may be that
lemon laws will hinder consumers more than they aid them.
157. See Honigman, supra note 155, at 119. But see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 681.10-.108 (West Supp. 1984) (consumer, not manufacturer, may choose
remedy of either new vehicle or refund of purchase price).
158. See Honigman, supra note 155, at 119, 120.
159. See, e.g., Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 833 (1973); Harris, A Radical Restatement of the law of
Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66
(1965); Schlosser, Construing UCC Section 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost-Volume Seller,
24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 686 (1973); Goetz & Scott, Measuring Sellers' Damages:
The lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979); Sebert, Remedies Under Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: An Agenda For Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360
(1981); Shanker, The Case/or a literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One Profit
for the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 697 (1973); Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead Under UCC Section 2-708(2): Economic Cost Theory and Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 681 (1972); Comment, A Theoretical Postscript:
Microeconomics and The lost Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 712 (1973)
(economic analysis of the problem).
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sue as well as other issues under U.C.C. § 2-708(2), 160 including
the scope of application of the section and the formula for determining the amounts recoverable under it. Moreover, in the area
of incidental and consequential damages, further study is required as to when and how such damages may be limited or totally excluded by contract provisions. 161 As for Article 2's statute
160. Section 2-708(2) states:
If the measure of damages provided in subsection (I) is inadequate
to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done
then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by the
buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in this Article
(Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due
credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
u.c.c. § 2-708(2) (1978).
161. Authorization or such a limitation or exclusion is found in§ 2-719(3):
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not.
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978). Most courts do not strike limitation or exclusion
clauses as unconscionable in a commercial setting. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (contractual exclusion of consequential damages is not unconscionable where claim is for commercial loss, parties were substantial business concerns, there was no unfair
surprise, and type of damages was expected), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982);
AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(contractual exclusion of consequential damages not unconscionable where both
parties are large, sophisticated merchants); KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F.
Supp. 892 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (contractual exclusion of consequential damages is
not unconscionable where facts demonstrate equality of bargaining power between merchants and absence of overreaching or pressure tactics, and resulting
contract is a facially fair one).
Although rare, some courts have found unconscionability in this setting.
See, e.g., Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981)
(contractual exclusion of consequential damages is unconscionable where seller
knew at time of contracting that there was chance that he would not be able to
produce enough livestock to meet contract requirements); F_rank's Maintenance
& Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980)
(contractual exclusion of consequential damages between merchants was unconscionable where limiting clause was neither conspicuous nor known to buyer at
time of contracting, clause directing buyer's attention to limitations on reverse
side was stamped over, and product defects were latent); Trinkle v. Schumacher
Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980) (limitations of consequential damages unconscionable where, under the circumstances, contract provides neither minimum nor adequate remedy to buyer).
On the other hand, courts have been less reluctant to delete clauses excluding consequential damages on the basis of unconscionability where the claimant
is a consumer, even in the absence of personal injury. See, e.g., McCarty v. EJ.
Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 34 7 A.2d 253 (1975) (limitation of consequential damages for personal injury unconscionable as matter of law, and similar limitation with regard to property damage is so tainted by unconscionability as to
warrant complete deletion oflimitations); Fischer v. General Elec. Hotpoint, 108
Misc. 2d 683, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1981) (exclusion of consequential damages un-
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of limitations, a few non-uniform amendments to U .C.C. § 2-725,
adopt a discovery rule, thus preserving the right to sue for personal injury damages. 162 Is that where the line should be drawn?
What of personal injuries caused by goods such as high tension
wire towers that fail? Of course, the issue should be handled
while the whole area of the relation of tort and contract is being
studied as suggested above. 163
In the case of non-consumer goods, consideration might be
given to further defining when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose and the extent to which that failure makes the other
provisions of Article 2 available to the economically injured
buyer. 164 For example, where the limited remedy is accompanied
by a provision for liquidated damages, is that provision also vitiated? 165 If the limited remedy is a part and parcel of a very reconscionable where consumer is in substantially poorer bargaining position and
seller should have been aware that consumer did not understand significance of
exclusion).
162. Amendments to § 2-725 take two forms. The first specifically mentions personal injury in the statutory language. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 7-2-725(2)
(1984) ("a cause of action for damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods shall accrue when the injury occurs"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2-725(2) (Supp. 1984-1985) ("A cause of action for personal injuries arising under this Article for breach of warranty occurs [sic] when the injury takes
place and is governed by the limitation of action period under Title 14, section
752."). The second form adopts as the general date for breach of warranty actions the date "when the breach is or should have been discovered." See, e.g.,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725(2) (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 57A-2-725(2) (1980).
163. For a discussion of the relation between tort and contract, see supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
164. Code comment provides that parties should be "free to shape their
remedies to their particular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or
modifying remedies [should] be given effect." U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1
(1978). However, the Code further provides that"[w]here circumstances cause
an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be
had as provided in this Act." U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
Unfortunately, no guidance is offered as to when such a failure occurs, and
as a result, the case law on this point is voluminous. For a small sampling of
recent cases, see Mateo Machine & Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727
F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1984) (remedy fails where defect persists despite numerous
repair efforts by both parties); Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983) (repair remedy fails when
seller is unable to promptly repair the product); Consolidated Data Terminals v.
Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983) (clause limiting
remedy to repairs failed of its essential purpose where warranted goods failed to
perform according to specifications despite seller's continued efforts to repair).
165. For cases in which courts have held that the clause for liquidated damages is also vitiated by a failure of a limited remedy clause, see, e.g., Mateo
Machine & Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1984);
Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Morris v. Chevrolet Motor Div. of General Motors Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 917, 114 Cal. Rptr. 747
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stricted warranty, does the warranty restriction also remain?
Case law addressing another remedy issue leaves doubt as to
the extent to which use of a product precludes the buyer's right to
revoke an acceptance, 166 and what the measure of recovery
should be when there is considerable use but revocation is nevertheless permitted. 167 Where consumers are involved, the courts,
(1974). For cases in which courts have held that the liquidated damages remedy
is not vitiated, see, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635
F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95
A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App.
503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980).
166. A brief review of the many cases in this area leads inexorably to the
realization that whether a buyer's revocation is timely under U.C.C. § 2-608(2) is
a "most persistently litigated yet perpetually confused question." J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 8-3, at 309 (2d ed. 1980). See also Myron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1968) (revocation of acceptance of racehorse after 24 hours is unreasonable); Max Bauer Meat Packer, Inc. v. United States, 458 F.2d 88 (Ct. Cl.
1972) (buyer's delay in revocation was unreasonable where it prevented seller
from reinspecting the goods, as the parties had agreed, to confirm non-conformity); Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo. App. 343, 483 P.2d 980
(1971) (revocation after four months of use is reasonable where buyer informed
seller of defect shortly after machine was installed); Birkner v. Purdon, 27 Mich.
App. 476, 183 N.W.2d 598 (1970) (revocation of acceptance of Christmas trees
on Dec. 21 is reasonable because of difficulty of discovering defect and seller's
assurances); White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 88 Misc. 2d 961, 389 N.Y.S.2d 724
(1976) (inspection and discovery of defect six months after passage of title is
reasonable where parties had previously agreed upon an inspection date and
passage of title was fortuitous); Berlin & Co. v. Whiting Mfg., Inc., 5 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (revocation within four months of
delivery is unreasonable where inspection of goods and discovery of defect
presented no difficulty); Sarnecki v. AIJohns Pontiac, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1121 (Pa. C.P. 1966) (revocation after five months and 3,000 miles is reasonable in purchase of automobile where buyer reported defect four days after
delivery); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d
349 ( 1976) (formal revocation within week of informing seller of intent to revoke
is reasonable in light of difficulty in discovering defect).
If a reconciliation of the case law is possible, we leave that attempt for another day. Suffice to say that four circumstances seem to have attained relevance: " ( 1) the difficulty of discovering the defect, (2) the terms of the contract,
(3) the relative perishability of the goods and (4) the course of performance after
the sale and before the formal rejection." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra, § 8-3,
at 309. For one interesting attempt at reconciliation, see Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Unifom1 Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1978).
167. In particular, is the seller entitled to compensation for the value of the
buyer's use of the goods before or following an effective revocation of acceptance or for both periods? Most courts and commentators would support such
an award. See, e.g., Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 527, 578
P.2d 668 ( 1978) (seller entitled to set-off for rental value of repossessed goods);
Lawrence v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(seller entitled to set-off for reasonable value of buyer's continued use after revocation); Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980) (seller entitled to
set-off for ascertainable use value from time of purchase to date of hearing on
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at least in some automobile cases, seem to balance the consumer's need for the product against the reduced opportunity
costs to the seller. 168 The pervasive "lemon laws" bear on this
point with varying solutions. 169 Should such a balancing approach be limited to consumer transactions or should it also be
applied to strictly commercial transactions, recognizing delays in
the law and the cash stringencies of many businesses?
4.

Four-Tier Damages Classification

The whole four-tier classification of damages in Article 2
might well be a subject of re-examination. The Code seems to
categorize damages as actual, incidental, consequential, and punitive. The policy stated in U.C.C. § 1-106 is that remedial proviremand less interest on purchase price); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285,
545 P.2d 1382 (1976) (seller rightfully awarded offset for rental of mobile home
during buyer's occupancy);]. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 166, § 8-3, at
317, 318; Phillips, Revocation ofAcceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 75 COM. LJ. 354
(1970); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales-Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After
Attempted Revocation of Acceptance Does Not Bar Such Revocation as a Matter of Law, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 763 (1974). The more difficult question, however, is how to
measure that compensation. Fair rental value, although an adequate starting
point, should not be dispositive, especially where the good was in some way
defective. See]. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 166, § 8-3, at 318.
168. For a recent example of a balancing of interests analysis, see McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 449 N.E.2d 1289
(1983). In McCullough, after giving notice of revocation of acceptance, the buyer
drove the automobile for an additional 23,000 miles. 5 Ohio St. 3d at 182, 449
N.E.2d at 1291. The court said:
[T]he trier of fact should pose and divine the answers to the following
queries: (1) Upon being apprised of the buyer's revocation of his acceptance, what instructions, if any, did the seller tender the buyer concerning return of the now rejected goods? (2) Did the buyer's business
needs or personal circumstances compel the continued use? (3) During
the period of such use, did the seller persist in assuring the buyer that
all nonconformities would be cured or that provisions would otherwise
be made to recompense the latter for the dissatisfaction and inconvenience which the defects caused him? (4) Did the seller act in good faith?
(5) Was the seller unduly prejudiced by the buyer's continued use?
Id. at 184, 449 N.E.2d at 1293. Interestingly, although the revocation was found
to be effective, the seller did not receive a value-of-use offset as it had neglected
to introduce any evidence proving the value of such use. Id. at 185 n.4, 449
N.E.2d at 1294 n.4.
169. See, e.g., Honigman, supra note 153, at 122. The author states:
Also of interest is whether the new lemon laws will be construed to
permit consumers to use their vehicles while awaiting resolution of
their case. The majority of lemon laws appear to be neutral with respect to consumer use after rescission, allowing a manufacturer, who
takes a vehicle back, a setoff for consumer use of the vehicle prior to
reporting the defect and "for any subsequent period when the vehicle
is not out of service by reason of repair."
Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of relevant state lemon Jaws, see supra
note 155.
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sions should be construed to place the aggrieved party in the
position it would have been in had the breaching party fully performed.170 Then there is a "but" clause providing that "neither
consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as
specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law." 171 The
comment states the purpose is to make clear that "compensatory
damages are limited to compensation. They do not include consequential or special damages . . . . " 172 Try to tell a buyer of
goods for resale that the "market-less contract" measure 173 puts
it in as good a position as if the seller had performed when resold
goods are being returned as defective by angry sub-buyers who
are taking their business elsewhere. Section 2-708(2) gives a
seller an "out" from the market contract rule 174 but only allows
loss of profits and incidental damages, not other consequentials.
Why? The buyer's market-contract rule permits a recovery of
both incidental and consequential damages and where a buyer
has procured cover, incidental and consequential damages are
also recoverable. 175 Why no consequentials for a seller who resells? Then, when the buyer has accepted the goods, the recovery
rule for compensatory damages is "loss resulting in the ordinary
course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable." 176 Subsection (3) ofU.C.C. § 2-714
allows recovery of incidental and consequential damages "in a
proper case." 177 Why the limit and what is its scope? When is
such recovery proper? Why should incidentals ever be limited?
Why limit consequentials if the proof is sufficiently definite, unless the limitation is consensual? Should it be taken that all these
limitations are subject to "agreement otherwise"? 178
170. Section 1-106(1) states:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special
nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this
Act or by other rule of law.
u.c.c. § 1-106(1) (1978).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 1-106(1) comment I.
173. See U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (1978).
174. The market-contract rule for sellers appears in U.C.C. § 2-708(1).
175. See U.C.C. § 2-712(1), (2) (1978).
176. Id.§ 2-714(1).
177. Id.§ 2-714(3).
178. See id.§ 1-102(4) ("The presence in certain provisions ... of the words
'unless otherwise agreed' or words of similar import does not imply that the
effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement. ... ").
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For breach of warranty, the buyer's damages are based on a
"value" differential "at the time and place of acceptance." 179 The
section provides an "out" where "special circumstances show
proximate damages of a different amount." 180 Do such special
circumstances make the situation a "proper case" for incidental
and consequential damages, as included in the term "proximate
damages"?
Do Article 2's damages rules suffer from too great a degree
of specificity? Should not the Code state a general principle, as is
found in U.C.C. § 1-106, 181 or a revision thereof, which would
merely distinguish between general damages and those unusual
damages, as to the potentiality of which the seller should be made
aware before entering into the contract? Should there not be a
statement of general principle that damages rules should be applied to prevent over-compensation? 182 Also, should there not be
a clear statutory statement on the extent, if any, of the duty to
mitigate damages?l83
The damages rules do not seem clearly drawn to meet the
179. Id. § 2-714(2). If, because of the non-conformity, the buyer would be
entitled to revoke the acceptance, then "the time and place of acceptance ... is
determined as of the ... decision not to revoke." Id. § 2-714(2) comment 3.
180. Id. § 2-714(2).
181. For the text ofU.C.C. § 1-106(1), see supra note 170.
182. The problem of over-compensation is frequently the focus of discussion involving the availability of an election of remedies under Article 2.
Should, for example, a buyer who covers be permitted to seek market damages if
that measure would yield a higher recovery? This and other over-compensation
issues are explored inJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 166, §§ 6-4, 7-7, at
233-34, 271-73; Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE LJ. 199,
256 (1963); Sebert, supra note 159, at 30-33; Vernon, Expecting Damages/or Breach
of Contract: A Primer and Critique, 1976 WASH. U .L.Q 179, 190-93.
183. A principle of mitigation does currently surface in U.C.C. § 2715(2)(a) (1978). It precludes recovery of consequential damages by a buyer if
the loss could have been "prevented by cover or otherwise." Id. Even in the
absence of any express Code mandate to mitigate, some courts have held that
that duty has survived the Code's enactment under U.C.C. § 1-103, which provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions." See, e.g., Schiavi
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722 (Me. 1983). In Gironda, the original buyer, after experiencing medical, financial, and marital difficulties,
breached the contract of purchase for a mobile home. Id. at 723. The seller
contacted the original buyer's father inquiring as to whether his son was still
planning to purchase the mobile home. Id. The father expressed doubt, but
offered to purchase the mobile home himself. Id. The seller ignored the father's
offer, thereafter reselling at a lower price. Id. The seller brought an action to
recover lost profits. Id. at 723-24. The Supreme Court of Maine ruled that the
seller had not properly mitigated his damages and refused to award him lost
profits. Id. at 725-26.
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realities of the marketplace with respect to lead times needed for
replacement purchases. For many things required by manufacturers there is not much of a "spot" market, and to secure sufficient quantities, the order must be given at some time ahead of
anticipated delivery. Should there not be some statutory recognition of this fact and of the loss caused by the delay, if proved?
The present interest rate market has made acute the problem
of costs incurred by reason of delays in payment. The area can be
called "prejudgment interest," but perhaps "delay damages"
would be a better term. It is significant that the New York Law
Revision Commission's objection to the inclusion of the phrase
"damages from delay or otherwise resulting from the breach" 184
in the term "incidental damages" in U.C.C. § 2-715(1) 185 was to
prevent such damages from always being classed as "incidental."
So far as Code language is concerned, the significance of the
characterization of damages as incidental rather than consequential seems to lie in the fact that consequential damages are clearly
subject to the "notice" or "foreseeability" requirement of Hadley
v. Baxendale, 186 reworded in the Code as "reason to know." 187
General and incidental damages are not expressly subject to such
a requirement. Perhaps these labels should be discarded in favor
of the Magnuson-Moss Act's distinction between "uncommon"
and "not uncommon" damages, which is made in the Federal
Trade Commission regulations. 188 Recovery of the former would
require "reason to know" at the time of contracting while recovery of the latter would not.

D. Inflation and Foreign Money Problems
1. Inflation and Damages for Delay
This tension between regular damages and consequential
damages will always arise where there is delay in payment due to
litigation or otherwise. In these cases, the dollar paid later can be
184. ALl-ABA, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 81 ("Reason for Change").
185. Section 2-715(1) labels as incidental damages those "expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach." U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1978).
186. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
187. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1978) (Consequential damages include "any
loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know.") (emphasis added).
188. 16 C.F.R. § 700.l(a) (1986).
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shown not to have the same purchasing power as the dollar when
payment was supposed to have been made. The point was well
made by Lord Justice Omrod, of the Court of Appeal, in William
Cory & Son Ltd. v. Wingate Investments Ltd.: 189

It is clear that the defendants have had the use of this
money ever since the date when they became liable to
compensate the plaintiffs for breach of contract.
It does not stop there. If the damages in this case
are to be assessed at 1972 or 1973 pounds, the defendants will save an enormous amount because they will be
able to pay a debt due in 1972 in 1980 pounds, which is
not reasonable, equitable or just. 190
Our law of damages needs revision to compensate for payments not timely made. For example, payment after final judgment in 1986, in present dollars, of the difference between the
contract and the market price for pigs in 1973, awarded in a suit
started in 1977, is not just compensation. 191 If the buyer "covers," the buyer's damages (cost of cover minus contract price)
should be adjusted to a dollar amount having the same purchasing power as the dollars used to effect cover had on the date of
use. If money was borrowed to effect cover, reimbursement for
interest actually paid should be included. If repayment was made
before judgment in the same number of dollars, the additional
"delay in payment" adjustment should start from the dates of repayment of the interest and loan principal. If the loan is not repaid, no delay in payment adjustment need be made as to the
principal, but interest paid after the breach date should be
adjusted.
If the buyer does not cover, should the delay damages be
based on the difference between the breach date cost of pigs and
the present cost of pigs? Or should the delay damages be based
on the difference in the purchasing power of money between the
determination date for the default (perhaps later than or earlier
than the actual breach date) and the judgment date? 192 Also,
189. Reported in [1980] 17 Build. L.R. (Eng.).
190. [ 1980] 17 Build. L.R. 109 (Eng.).
19 l. Assume the buyer still wanted three pigs. The 1973 market price of
pigs would not buy three pigs in 1986. Assume the buyer covered at a price, for
immediate delivery, above the contract price. The buyer has been deprived of
all opportunity value for the use of the excess for 12 years. Should there not be
compensation for this loss?
192. The problem has been discussed in connection with damages for defective construction. See Feldman & Libling, Inflation and the Duty to Mitigate, 95
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should delay damages continue until the judgment is actually
paid? Since there are delays of many years between a contract
breach and a collection on a final judgment, these problems will
be with us for some time. The rate of inflation may have slowed
recently, but the gap between the value of 1979 or 1982 dollars
and the present dollar continues to widen nevertheless.
Finally, on this issue, how should delay damages be calculated? Under present statutes and case law, the rules for "prejudgment interest" are far from uniform or suitable in a time of
high borrowing costs.1 93 Mr. and Mrs. Keir, in their article, 19 4
suggest that the law has not kept pace with modern economic theory. They would, for corporations and businesses, base delay
damage on the lost opportunity cost to the particular business
based on either the average cost of capital or the average historical return on investment. 195 For individuals, they would take, depending on the individual, the rate of return on a low risk liquid
LAw Q REV. 270 (1979); Waddams, The Date/or the Assessment of Damages, 97 LAw
Q REV. 445 (1981); Wallace, Inflation and Assessment of Construction Cost Damages,
98 LAw Q REV. 406 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Wallace, Inflation and Assessment];
Wallace, Cost of Repair and Inflation, 96 LAw Q REV. 406 (1982). The problem
also arises in determining proper compensation for tort injuries. See Royal
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury Report,
Vol. III Overseas System of Compensation, CMD. No. 7054-111 (Mar. 1978).
For other discussions, see K. RosENN, LAw AND INFLATION ( 1982); Mackaay &
Fabien, Civil Law and the Fight Against Inflation-A Legal and Economic Analysis of the
Qy,ebec Case, 45 LA. L. REV. 719 (1984); Rea, Inflation and The Law of Contract and
Torts, 14 OTTAWA L. REV. 465 (1982); Comment, Inflation As an Assessment Factor in
Contract Damage Awards, 45 LA. L. REV. 69 (1984).
193. In the first place, many statutes award prejudgment interest only if the
basic claim is for a sum certain. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. CODE§ 3287(a) (West 1970);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 2-3 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.04-.05 (West 1974
& Supp. 1985). See also Leslie Salt Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 657
(9th Cir. 1981) (applying California law, court upheld award of prejudgment
interest for defendant's refusal to pay cash value of damaged machine under
insurance policy); Weiland Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Whitney, 100 Ill. App. 2d 116,
241 N.E.2d 533 (1968) (prejudgment interest is allowable only when claim is for
liquidated damages or for sum ascertainable by simple and certain calculation);
rev'd on other grounds, 44 Ill. 2d 105, 251 N.E.2d 242 (1969); Benke v.
Mukwonago-Vernon Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis. 2d 356, 329 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App.
1982) (prejudgment interest is recoverable only in cases that involve liquidated
damages or damages susceptible of reliable and reasonably accurate methods of
calculation). See generally Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77
Nw. U.L. REV. 192 (1982).
It is not clear whether a suit for "cover" fits these rules. Also, the rates are
not the current borrowing rates. In present statutes, the percentage rates range
from 5% to 15%. For a discussion of the often large disparity between the statutory and market rates, see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
194. Keir & Keir, Opportunity Cost: A Measure of Prejudgment Interest, 39 Bus.
LAw. 129 (1983).
195. Id. at 148. The authors suggest that the "particular facts of a case or
the availability of evidence may determine [which measure] is used. Ifno proof
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investment or, if higher, the individual's historical return rate on
investments. 196 On the other hand, the Law Reform Commission
of the Canadian Province of Manitoba, in its 1982 report, 197 took
the position that a market interest rate reflected an estimate of
future inflation while prejudgment compensation is to compensate
for past inflation, so that application of a current interest rate was
not the answer. As one commentator observed, the current rate
is not even a reliable barometer of existing and future rates of
inflation:
Central bank and related rates of interest simply have
not been, as Professor Waddams (and indeed other
transatlantic writers) seem to suppose, so calculated as
to compensate a lender for actual or prospective rates of
inflation. Thus in 1974-75 in the United Kingdom with
then current rates of inflation well in excess of 20 per
cent, bank rates never rose above 12 3/4 per cent.198
The Manitoba Commission made some forty recommendations, but in essence the Commission would find what economists
call the "real interest rate" and multiply it by the time elapsed, to
which would be added the percentage change in an appropriate
price index from the due date to the judgment date to compensate for the lost purchasing power of money. 199 If, however, the
creditor had in fact borrowed a sum to cover the non-payment,
the report recommends awards of the actual costs of the borrowing in place of its formula. 200 Where money was borrowed to acquire the goods for delivery to be repaid on receipt of the buyer's
payment, should not all costs created by extending the life of the
loan until damages are received be recoverable, including the lost
can be or is supplied of either measure, a business entity would seem to be entitled to ... the average return on market funds." Id. at 148-49.
196. Id. at 149. The authors suggest that the "awards should range from a
minimum of the yield on money market investments or treasury bills and, if
higher, should have a maximum of either the individual's cost of borrowing, his
historical return on investment, or the average rate earned on mutual funds."
Id. at 150.
197. MANITOBA LAw REFORM COMMISSION REPORT ON PREJUDGMENT COMPENSATION ON MONEY AWARDS, REPORT No. 47 Uan. 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as REPORT No. 4 7]. For a critical discussion of this report, see Hammond, Compensation for the lost Value of Money: A Canadian Proposal, 99 LAw Q REV. 68
(1983).
198. Wallace, Inflation and Assessment, supra note 192, at 409-10 (footnotes
omitted).
199. See REPORT No. 47, supra note 197, at 74-75.
200. See id. at 55-59.
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opportunity costs on any disbursements, such as fees and periodic
interest payments? If, as in Bulk Oil (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading
Co., 201 interest on the borrowed money is paid out in periodic
payments during the life of the loan, delay damages, as the case
held, should be payable in respect of each such payment.
An issue for a review committee, then, is whether the Code
should provide a guideline rule for delay damages to cover lost
opportunity costs and changes in the value of money.
2.

The Money of the Contract

As trade expands and becomes international, or even without
any international features, in today's world of finance, should not
the parties be able to select the money in which they wish to deal,
at least as far as state law is concerned?
If the parties have selected a particular currency as the "store
of value" they wish to govern their transaction, they can only do
so up to a point. If a law suit results in the United States, we
convert the selected currency to United States dollars under
either the "breach day" rule2o2 or the "judgment day" rule. 203 If
actual payment occurred on the date of the breach, there would
be no problem. The party receiving the payment could convert
dollars into the desired currency that same day. But if payment
does not happen then, years can pass from breach day to judgment day. After judgment, appeals follow so that the actual transfer of funds may occur several years after the judgment date.
During the extended period from either the breach date or the
judgment date, the "store of value" is not that for which the par201. 697 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1983).
202. For a discussion of the interrelation of the "breach day rule" and the
"judgment day rule," see the opinion of Judge Frank in Shaw, Savill, Albion &
Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1951). Both the "breach day"
and the ''judgment day" rules address the issue of which is the appropriate date
for application of an exchange rate to damage awards: the date of the breach or
the date of the judgment. The choice of one rule over the other has important
consequences due to fluctuations in currency values. For an application of the
breach day rule, see Librairie Hachette, S.A. v. Paris Book Center, Inc., 62 Misc.
2d 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (rule selected to prevent defendant
from profitting by non-payment). The Code, in U.C.C. § 3-107(2), seems to
choose the "breach day" rule for instruments calling for a payment in a foreign
currency. However, the last sentence of the official text reads: "If such an instrument specifies a foreign currency as the medium of payment the instrument
is payable in that currency." It appears, therefore, that § 3-107 (2)' s preference
for the "breach day" rule is merely a rule of interpretation. U.C.C. § 3-107(2)
(1978). New York and a few other states have omitted the last sentence.
203. For an application of the judgment day rule, sec, e.g., Island Territory
of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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ties contracted but is the United States dollar. Should not the
parties be able, subject to national currency control laws, to specify the risk of fluctuations in monetary purchasing power that they
wish to assume? If the suit had been brought in the country
whose currency was nam.'!d, the judgment would have been in the
currency of that country. Should the dollar value of recovery vary
with the location of the selected forum?
Again turning to English precedent, we find that this jurisdiction has done just what is hinted at above in several recent cases.
The first allowed an appeal of a German corporation seeking
judgment in German deutsche marks. 204 In the second, the
House of Lords approved conversion from the agreed currency
on the date of actual payment or the issuance of execution process if the payment was not made in the currency in which the
judgment was entered. 205 If payment was made in pounds sterling by the judgment debtor or by the sheriff as a result of an
execution sale, the clerk of courts would be supplied with an affidavit stating the converted value so that credit could be entered
on the judgment roll showing a judgment for a specific amount of
the foreign currency. 206
In two maritime cases three years later, The Despina Rand The
Folias, 207 the principle adopted was to search for the basic currency actually used by the party whose payments were to be reimbursed. 208 Repairs to a ship were paid first in Chinese currency
for temporary repairs, and later in Japanese yen for further repair, but since the money used was withdrawn from a United
States dollar account, the ensuing judgment for reimbursement
was entered in dollars.2o9
A subsequent case, B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Hunt (No.
2),2 10 involved the frustration of a contract between British Petro204. Schorsch Meier Gmbh v. Hennin, [1975] 1 QB. 416 (using England's
adherence to Treaty of Rome (Common Market) as one ground for affirming
award of arbitrators).
205. Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., [1975] 3 All E.R. 801
(H.L.).
206. The date of payment selected by Lord Wilberforce was the date "when
the court authorises enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling." Id. at
813-14.
207. The Despina Rand Folias, (1979] 1 All E.R. 421 (H.L.). One case was
in contract, the other in tort. The House of Lords determined the currency "in
which the loss was effectively felt" and held that judgment be entered in that
currency.
208. Id. at 422.
209. Id.
210. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 232. See also President oflndia v. Taygetos Shipping
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leum and Nelson Bunker Hunt to exploit Libyan oil discoveries.
The frustration resulted from the expropriation of the subject of
the venture by the Libyan government. 211 Payments were due
from Hunt, in part, for oil actually diverted from British Petroleum and for his share of the development expense. 212 The judgment for the oil was entered in United States dollars as that was
the currency of the international oil trade. But the judgment for
the reimbursement of development expense was entered in
pounds sterling as that was the currency used by British Petroleum to purchase Libyan currency for payments and to buy materials used. 213
In today's world there would seem to be no reason why a
commercial code should not permit parties to specify the currency that they desire to use as the "store of value" for their
transactions. It should make no difference whether it is the currency actually employed or whether it is chosen because of its stability of purchasing power.

E.

Other Problems

At this point it may not be out of place to suggest that the
Code may be a bit out of date in so often referring to the "intent"
of the parties. It should be clear that actual internal mental intention does not and should not govern. We suggest that the word
"intent" and the phrase "if the parties so intend" be re-examined
with a view to substituting either "if the parties so provide" or "if
the conduct of the parties so indicates." If, for example, a
Co. SA (The Agenor), [ 1985] l Lloyd's L.R. 155. In The Agenor, the parties specified demurrage at $6,000 a day payable in pounds at $2.2878 to one pound. At
the time of the award $1.2390 equaled one pound. Id. at 156-57. The court
ruled that due to the contract terms the judgment was to be in pounds sterling
determined at the conversion rate specified in the contract. Id. at 158.
211. [1981] l W.L.R. at 238-40.
212. Id. at 239-40.
213. Id. at 245. In another case addressing a similar issue, Lord Wilberforce stated, "In the case of a company in liquidation, the corresponding date
for conversion would be the date when the creditor's claim ... is admitted by the
liquidator." Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., [1975) 3 All E.R. at 814.
See also In re Lines Bros. Ltd. (in Liquidation) (No. 2) [1984) 2 W.L.R. 905 (discussing the Miliangos principle). Some legislative changes might be required in
this country. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 144 comment
b (1971); Becker, The Currency of judgment, 25 AM. J. COMP. LAw 152 (1977);
Bowles & Philips,judgments in Foreign Cases: An Economist's View, 39 Moo. L. REV.
196 (1976). For problems of foreign procurement where appropriations in dollars must be drawn upon for each partial payment, see Ciucci & Hoppe, legal
Aspects of Contracting When the Currency Rate is Fluctuating: How the Problem was Handled in Japan, What Future Problems Can Be Expected, and Suggestions as to How They
May be Alleviated, 16 A.F.L. REV. 53 (1974).
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money of the contract" rule is to be adopted, consideration
should be given to opening the verbal formulation with "if the
parties so provide .... "
The artists of today have not liked the consignment provisions of the Code in which their goods become subject to the
creditors of the dealer. 214 Several statutes have been enacted insulating consignors of art objects from the claims of the consignees' creditors. 215 But should the consignors of art objects be the
only ones receiving special protection?2 16 Are there other businesses where consignment for sale is so prevalent that a duty of
inquiry should be placed on the creditor rather than placing a
duty of disclosure on the consignor? One state, California, has
felt that consumer consignors need protection from a dealer's
214. See U.C.C. § 2-326(2)-(3) (1978). This section renders consigned
goods subject to the claims of the consignee's creditors where the goods are
delivered for sale to a consignee who "maintains a place of business at which he
deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name other than the name of the
[consignor]." Id. § 2-326(3). To shield its interest in the goods, the consignor
must comply with the filing provisions of Article 9 or a rarely, if at all existent,
state sign law, or show that the consignee is generally known by its creditors to
be dealing in consigned goods. See id. § 2-326(3)(a)-(c).
The consignment rule can therefore be seen as penalizing a consignor who
permits its interest to remain unknown, i.e., who creates but fails to cure the
consignee's ostensible ownership of the goods. The traditional rationale is to
protect those creditors of the consignees who would otherwise be "misled by the
secret reservation." Id. § 2-326 comment 2. Whether ostensible ownership concerns continue to justify the Code's approach is open to question. See, e.g., Dolan, The UCC's Consignment Rule Needs an Exception for Consumers, 44 Omo ST. LJ.
21 (1983); infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-326(5) (Supp. 1985). This provision
makes U.C.C. § 2-326 inapplicable "to the placement of works of fine art [by the
artist] on consignment, which shall be governed by the provisions of article 15 of
title 6, C.R.S." Id. The reference is to the Consignment of Works of Fine Art
Act, which applies only to works of art delivered by the creating artist to an art
dealer. The statute uses an "in trust" approach.
New Mexico and Texas add a new item in § 2-326(3), referring to similar
statutes protecting artists in those jurisdictions. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2326(3)(d) (1985); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2-326(c)(4) (Vernon 1968 &
Supp. 1985). Alaska adds to its U.C.C. § 2-326 a new subsection stating that
works of art consigned by the creating artist are not subject to the claims of the
consignee's creditors. It also includes definitions of terms. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.02.326(e)(l)-(3) (1980). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-326(5) (1961 &
Supp. 1985) ("provisions of this Section shall not apply to the placement of
works of fine art on consignment"); Mrcu. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 440.2326(5)
(West Supp. 1985) ("Whenever a person delivers or causes to be delivered a
work of fine art to an art dealer ... the work of fine art is not subject to the
claims of the art dealer's creditors .... ").
216. As the title to his article suggests, Professor Dolan argues that consumer consignment should be excluded from the scope of U.C.C. § 2-326. See
Dolan, supra note 214; see also CAL. CoM. CODE § 2-326(3)(d) (West 1964 &
Supp. 1985) (exclusionary paragraph added by non-uniform amendment).
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creditors. 217 Claims of secured creditors as purchasers 218 seem to
be covered in some statutes. In others, a purchaser takes free of a
consignor's interest, but the "payment" received is a trust fund
for the owner. These latter statutes may create, in connection
with general inventory financing, a tracing problem, so some clarification seems needed.
Indeed, with the modern use of credit reports, credit investigations, and balance sheet analysis by sellers' credit departments,
perhaps the time has come to remove the remaining vestiges of
the doctrine of ostensible ownership as it protects unsecured
creditors. 219 Conceivably, the provision in U.C.C. § 2-326(3)
protecting consignors where it is generally known that the consignee deals in consigned goods could be expanded. It could
protect consignors, even against a secured party claiming good
faith purchaser status, where dealers in goods of that kind often
deal in consigned goods. Secured parties, like other persons extending credit, should perhaps be required to rely on their credit
investigations. 220
217. California has added a paragraph (d) to § 2-326(3), creating a list of
actions that defeat creditors of the consignee. The section provides in part:
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and the person
maintains a place of business at which he or she deals in goods of the
kind involved, under a name other than the name of the person making
delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on sale or return ....
However, this subdivision is not applicable if the person making delivery does any of the following:
(d) Delivers goods which the person making delivery used or
bought for use for personal, family, or household purposes.
CAL. CoM. CooE § 2-326(3)(d) (West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
218. U.C.C. § 1-201(12) includes "a secured creditor" in the definition of
"creditor," but U.C.C. § 1-201(33) defines a purchaser as one "who takes by
purchase." The term "purchase" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(32) as "taking by
... mortgage, pledge, lien ... or any other voluntary transaction creating an
interest in property." Thus, if a consignment passes title to the consignee, the
after-acquired property clause of an inventory-secured party would prevail over
the consignor, as also, under U.C.C. § 2-403(2) and (3), would a buyer in the
ordinary course of business.
219. The need to regulate the separation of ownership and possession of
property depends in large part on the extent to which unsecured creditors rely
on their debtor's possession. It has been suggested that as a result of modern
credit practices they do not:
At one time creditors may have relied on their debtor's stock in
trade, but modern commercial lenders, beginning with the advent of
open-account selling and inventory financing, stopped extending credit
based on a debtor's ostensible ownership of merchandise. Today creditors either investigate that appearance or do not rely on it at all.
Dolan, supra note 214, at 29.
220. Conspicuously absent from the literature is a consensus on the quan-
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The entrusting section 221 may also need to be clarified to
make clear just what knowledge should be attributable to a reasonable entruster about the entrustee's operations before the rule
applies. 222 If the repair function is exercised at a separate location from the selling function, or two separate businesses are conducted, should the rule be different than the rule for a unified
business at one location? 223 Should there be a "trust fund" approach to the proceeds received by the entrustee?22 4
tum of reliance that secured parties place on their secured status when extending credit. Compare Dolan, supra note 214, at 30 n.49 ("It would be a mistake
to underestimate the extent to which lenders with security interests take those
interests only as a precaution. Because large corporations usually borrow on the
strength of their financial statements and profit history, the security interest in
inventory is often a small consideration.") with Baird & Jackson, Possession and
Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 183-84
(1983) ("The secured creditor is able to offer a lower rate of interest precisely
because he does not rely solely on the debtor's honesty and general financial
health. He is thus necessarily interested in discovering which assets a debtor
owns and what claim others might have upon those assets."). Professors Baird
and Jackson also question the efficacy of private credit investigations to provide
this needed information:
In a private system, unassisted by a legal rule, a creditor who does
not discover interests superior to his own does not know whether such
interests do not exist or whether they do exist but are not reflected in
private files. This reflects a fundamental problem a debtor has in convincing creditors that he has been telling the truth; in the absence of an
ability to check the debtor's story, creditors will be inherently suspicious of a debtor, who can gain advantage by misbehaving . . . . In a
public system, however, because of the existence of a legal rule, the
absence of a record of a superior interest is unambiguous, because unless the interest is recorded, it cannot be superior. It therefore provides a reliable check on the veracity of the information provided by the
debtor.
Id. at 184 n.34. The authors question whether, in fact, lenders taking security
offer lower interest rates. The choice may well be "no loan" versus "secured
loan." See also Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (l 985). See also Jackson &
Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 987 (1985).
221. The Code's entrustment provisions are U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) and (3).
Cf U.C.C. § 7-503(a), (b) (1978).
222. Section 2-403(2) requires that the entrusting be to a "merchant" who
deals in goods of that kind. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978). Is it also required that
the entruster know the entrustee is such a merchant? For an affirmative answer,
see Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400
(1967). See also Leary & Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. REV.
50, 84-85 (l 981) ("knowledge of the ... status of the en trustee by the en truster
is essential").
223. Once more, the answer must depend on what, if any, relevance attaches to the knowledge of the entruster concerning the scope of the en trustee's
business. Not to be ignored is the existence of certificate of title acts. If the
entrusted goods are subject to such an act, should that make a difference? On
these and other "entrustment" problems, see Leary & Sperling, supra note 222.
224. The sale by the entrustee gives the entruster a cause of action for the
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The doctrine of "cure" where a defective tender is made and
its effect on the perfect tender rule could be clarified, 225 as well as
the issue under U.C.C. § 2-508(2), as to whether a "further reasonable time" is available to a seller who had no reason to believe
the tender was defective. 226 Perhaps here we need to make a distinction between an original producer and one who sells prepackaged goods produced by another.221
In another area, do the courts need more guidance on the
merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds rule of U.C.C. § 220122s and the other exceptions ?229 Should the interrelation of
value of the goods converted. This, however, is an unsatisfactory remedy where
the entrustee's insolvency would require the entruster to share ratably with
other creditors. Perhaps this would be an appropriate situation in which to impress a constructive trust or equitable lien upon the proceeds. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES § 172, at 520 (l 970) ("whenever the
elements of a constructive trust or equitable lien are present, section 1-103 will
justify the use of these remedies in code cases"). The issue is reminiscent of that
involving a claim to proceeds by a reclaiming cash or credit seller. For a discussion of claim to proceeds by a reclaiming cash or credit seller, see supra note 131
and accompanying text.
225. The perfect tender rule generally allows a buyer to reject a tender "if
the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-601 (1978). This right, like most, is not absolute. It is at all
times subject to the seller's right to cure under U.C.C. § 2-508. Unfortunately,
the inherent conflict between these two sections has never been satisfactorily
resolved. The academic literature and case law has caused one commentator to
lament, "Cure has become discretionary." Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A
Quarter Century Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments, 13 GA. L. REv. 805, 835 (1979).
226. Once the seller's time for performance has passed, cure is permitted
under § 2-508(2) only if "the seller had reasonable grounds to believe [the
tender] would be acceptable with or without money allowance." U.C.C. § 2508(2) (l 978). Interpreting the wording of this subsection is no easy task. In
particular, the section offers no criteria upon which to ascertain when a seller
has reasonable grounds to believe a buyer would accept a nonconforming
tender. For an overview of the commentary and case law on this point, see
Schmitt & Frisch, The Perfect Tender Rule-An "Acceptable" Interpretation, 13 U. To.
L. REV. 1375 (1982).
227. Put another way, should the right to cure extend to a seller who is
mistaken as to the quality of the goods or should it be limited to those who know
the tender is nonconforming? Compare Meads v. Davis, 22 N.C. App. 479, 481,
206 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1974) ("Obviously this section deals with the situation in
which the seller knows prior to delivery that the goods are not in conformity
.... ")(emphasis in original) with]oc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
107 Misc. 2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("compelling equitable considerations exist to extend the § 2-508(2) remedy to those innocent sellers who
have no prior predelivery knowledge of nonconformity"). Perhaps here, also, a
distinction between "off the shelf" goods purchased for resale and seller-manufactured goods, with knowledge of nonconformity required only for the latter
case, could be appropriate.
228. Under U.C.C. § 2-201 (2), the Statute of Frauds is satisfied when a
merchant fails to object to a timely confirmation of an oral contract within l 0
days after receipt, with reason to know the contents. This ostensibly straightfor-
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that rule and the parol evidence rule of U.C.C. § 2-202 be clariward provision has generated an astounding number of cases involving diverse
issues. One of the most frequently litigated ones is who is or is not a merchant.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Arnst, 534 F. Supp. 360 (D. Mont. 1982) (farmer who entered
into oral "futures" contract was not merchant as he possessed no special knowledge or skill with respect to commodities market); Cudahy Foods Co. v. Holloway, 55 N.C. App. 626, 286 S.E.2d 606 (1982) (real estate broker who
guaranteed payment for shipment of cheese to third party was not merchant as
she did not deal in cheese or hold herself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to goods in question).
Another frequently litigated issue is when a writing qualifies as a "writing in
confirmation" of an alleged oral agreement. See, e.g., Great Western Sugar Co.
v. Lone Star Donut Co., 721 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1983) (writing did not qualify as
confirmation since it was an offer, not a confirmation); East Europe Domestic
Int'l Sales Corp. v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co., 572 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (one defendant's writing did not qualify as it did not evidence prior agreement; other defendant's writing did qualify as writing in confirmation). Recently, the Seventh Circuit decided a case with profound implications. See
Thomson Printing Mach. Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 714 F.2d 744 (7th Cir.
1983). In Thomson Printing, the Seventh Circuit was of the opinion that the term
"receipt" in U.C.C. § 2-201 (2) does not require receipt by a particular agent of
an organization. As a result, receipt by the mailroom is receipt by the organization. Id. at 746-48. Elsewhere, we have suggested that "[c]orporate counsel
may find their client's mail room procedures worth examining in the light of the
case." Leary & Frisch, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions,
Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 39 Bus. LAw. 1851, 1857 (1984).
229. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201(3)(a)-(c) (1978). Subsections 2-201(3)(a)-(c) specifically provide:
(3) A contract does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (l) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and
are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and
under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for
the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture
or commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond
the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 3-606).
Id. These other statutory exceptions have also produced a stream of litigation
that shows no signs of abating. If that were not enough to justify a second look
at the statute, the situation is further exacerbated by conflicting judicial authority on the question of whether any nonstatutory exceptions to the statute should
be recognized. The principal candidate is promissory estoppel. For cases receptive to an estoppel challenge, see, e.g., Allen M. Campbell Co., General Contractors v. Virginia Metal Indus., 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983) (under North
Carolina law, promissory estoppel is exception to statute of frauds); R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., Inc., 606 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1979)
(Illinois no longer considers statute of frauds a complete bar to recovery on
promissory estoppel theory); Warden & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979) (Iowa statute of frauds does not displace doctrine of
promissory estoppel in relation to sale of goods); Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v.
Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 230 N.W.2d 588 (1975) (principle of promissory estoppel is not displaced by U.C.C.; however, it was inapplicable here as actual con-
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fied? There are decisions holding that the unanswered memorandum cannot be contradicted. 230 In today's electronic age, the
whole concept of a signed writing may need rethinking. A rule
having the same protective effect would be one that merely requires substantially contemporaneous objective evidence indicating that both of the parties had a deal as to an ascertainable
quantity of an ascertainable subject matter. This could be described as a "finger pointing" rule where the objective conduct,
as distinct from oral testimiony as to conversations, demonstrates
the existence of a contract with a particular subject matter. 231
In any event, the application of whatever rule is adopted for
U .C.C. § 2-201 must be suitable for computer to computer ordering. While a "writing" is defined to include any reduction to tangible form, 232 it should be made clear that the reduction to
tangible form can be made at a later date and need not be made at
the time of the transaction. The potential to create hard copy
tract existed). For cases that have been unreceptive, see, e.g., C.R. Fedrick, Inc.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ninth Circuit concluded
that California Supreme Court would not permit doctrine of promissory estoppel as exception to statute of frauds as it would render statute of frauds a nullity); McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.C. 1982) (under
South Carolina law, promissory estoppel cannot be used to circumvent U.C.C.'s
statute of frauds); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 96 Wash. 2d 291, 635 P.2d
103 (1981) (increased litigation and confusion would necessarily result if promissory estoppel were allowed to overcome valid statute of frauds defense). See
generally Duesenberg, The Statute of Frauds in its 300th Year: The Challenge of Admissions in Court and Estoppel, 33 Bus. LAw. 1859 (1978). Although promissory estoppel is the most frequently asserted nonstatutory exception, there is authority
supportive of others. See, e.g., H.B. Alexander & Son, Inc. v. Miracle Recreation
Equip. Co., 314 Pa. Super. 1, 460 A.2d 343 (1983) (statute of frauds waived
through course of dealing and conduct).
230. See David]. Joseph Co. v. S & M Scrap Metal Co., 163 Ga. App. 685,
295 S.E.2d 860 ( 1982) (purchase confirmation became, through failure to object, a final integrated agreement). Accord Shipilberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 535 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1976). These courts were unpersuaded by § 2-201, which correctly recognizes that although the statute has been
satisfied, "the burden of persuading the trier of fact that a contract was in fact
made orally prior to the written confirmation is unaffected.'' U.C.C. § 2-201
comment 3 ( 1978). These are important cases because if the approach is followed, the confirmer receives a tremendous advantage that, in most instances,
cannot be justified.
231. Many of the exceptions to the Statute of Charles, and other pre-Code
statutes were justified on the "finger pointing" basis. This is particularly true of
the "earnest money" exception, and the "substantial improvement" exception
in real estate cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 illustrations 3-5 (1977); id.§ 129 reporter's note (citing cases). The exceptions specified in U.C.C. §§ 2-201(3)(a)-(c) do not adequately cover the field. For the text
of this section, see supra note 229.
232. See U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1978). "'Written' or 'writing' includes printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible form." Id.
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should be sufficient. The "signature" definition, even now, would
accommodate such a change in the definition of writing.2 33
Computer to computer contracting may soon become prevalent and can be aided if there are appropriate gap fillers that give
choices appropriate to various trades. One can imagine, for example, a Code with warranty choices of various types, so that the
messages between merchants would need only say, for example,
"G.C. 1A2C3B." 234 This would then incorporate the text of
choice A in the first gap filler, choice C in the second, and choice
Bin the third. The Code could also have a rule that would apply,
between merchants, where no choice is made, and a separate rule
that would apply between merchants and consumers. 235
The concept of a retraction of an anticipatory repudiation is
another area worthy of re-examination. 236 If the essence of a contract for sale is an assured expectation of the power to control
goods or to receive money at the date set for performance,237
then any action which impairs a reasonable person's assured expectation is a breach, and should have the same consequences as
any other breach. 238 As in the case of other breaches, an accord
233. The term " '[s]igned' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a
party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Id. § 1-201(39). Strong
evidence that the definition was intended to be a flexible one is found in the
comment, which urges courts to "use common sense and commercial experience
in passing upon these matters." Id. § 1-201 comment 39.
234. A statutory catalog of alphabetically designated terms for incorporation by numerical or other digital reference is not new. Some years ago, New
York adopted a similar statute for provisions in powers of attorney to include all
powers listed and not stricken. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW§ 5-1501 (McKinney
Supp. 1986). Checks today, as a practical matter, numerically designate the
bank on which they are drawn. Such a statute would greatly simplify computer
to computer or telex to telex contracting.
235. A merchant to merchant rule could well have periods of time for making claims and limitations on remedies or the quantum of damages that would
not be appropriate vis-a-vis consumers.
236. The aggrieved party's rights following an anticipatory repudiation are
the subject of U.C.C. § 2-610; retraction of such repudiation is the subject of
u.c.c. § 2-611.
237. The Code defines the general obligations of the parties in the following terms: "The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the
buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract." U.C.C. § 2-301
(1978). This is, however, a statement of the parties' ultimate expectation.
There is, in addition. an interim expectation: "A contract for sale imposes an
obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired." Id. § 2-609(1).
238. Although repudiation vests the aggrieved party with certain rights, the
term is without definition. We are told only that a repudiation occurs if a party
fails to provide timely assurance of performance following a justified demand
under U.C.C. § 2-609. See U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (1978). One definitional possibility is to adopt the language of U.C.C. § 2-609(1), so that any impairment of a
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and satisfaction or an agreed modification can restore the assured
expectation. 239 But after a breach, should unilateral action by the
breaching party be permitted to, in effect, restore the contract? In
our law there are several instances of unilateral restoration. One
is in the retraction of a waiver. 240 Another is the doctrine of cure
where a tender is defective. 241 The retraction of an anticipatory
repudiation is a third. 242 But the first two have a different impact
on the aggrieved party's expectations than the third.2 43
The situations are somewhat different in each case. In the
waiver situation, unilateral action first made the burden of perparty's interim expectation is a repudiation. See supra note 237. Perhaps what
has so far dissuaded courts from its adoption is the statement in comment l to
§ 2-610, reminiscent of the pre-Code formulation, that "anticipatory repudiation centers upon an overt communication of intention or an action which renders performance impossible or demonstrates a clear determination not to
continue with performance." U.C.C. § 2-610 comment l (1978). In fact, courts
seem to treat a U.C.C. § 2-609 demand for assurances as a necessary first step in
order to satisfy the comment's standards of"impossibility" and "clearness." See,
e.g., UMIC Government Sec., Inc. v. Pioneer Mortgage Co., 707 F.2d 251 (6th
Cir. 1983); Bill's Coal Co. v. Board ofPub. Utils., 682 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied,459U.S. ll7l (1981).
239. The basic Code provision dealing with modifications and waivers is
U.C.C. § 2-209. Although consideration is unnecessary for either to be effective,
the standard of good faith must be met. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1978). See
U.C.C. § 2-l03(l)(b) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade."). See generally Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC:
Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 lowA L. REV. 849 (1979),
Roszkowski, Contract Modification and the Statute of Frauds: Making Sense of Section 2209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 ALA. L. REV. 51 (1984).
240. Section 2-209(5) provides:
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received
by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.
u.c.c. § 2-209(5) (1978).
241. For a discussion of the "cure" doctrine, see supra notes 224-25 and
accompanying text.
242. See U .C.C. § 2-611 ( 1) (1978) ("Until the repudiating party's next performance is due he can retract his repudiation unless the aggrieved party has
since the repudiation cancelled or materially changed his position or otherwise
indicated that he considers the repudiation final.").
243. For a discussion of the effect of a retraction of an anticipatory repudiation on the aggrieved party's expectations, see supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. Note that the retraction of a waiver is by one who previously
indicated that a right would not be enforced. It may not be retracted to defeat
detrimental reliance. See U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1978). Cure after a defective
tender is also limited and requires prompt notice. See id. § 2-508(1). Controls
on retraction of an anticipatory repudiation also exist, but a repudiation is, we
feel, more devastating to the aggrieved party's expectations than the prospective
working of a waiver or the "oop" offer of cure.
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formance easier. The retraction restores an agreed term and can
only be done with respect to future performances not affected by
reliance on the waiver.2 44
In the cure situation, the attempt at restoration must
promptly follow a rejected profferred performance, and prompt
notice that the defect will be corrected is required.2 45 Indeed, in
many instances of cure, the defect can be seen as the result of an
innocent mistake by the party making the tender. There may be
an innocent undercount, or inclusion of a wrong size where the
seller has numerous sizes. Or, the seller may have been misled by
one or several of its suppliers. Here the expectation of assured
control over goods is not subjected to the same destruction as in
the case of an anticipatory repudiation where there is a signal of
total non-performance. 246 Hence, our conclusion is that the concept of unilateral retraction of an anticipatory repudiation could
be separately re-examined and possibly changed. This would not
necessitate a like change in the doctrines of waiver and cure.
IV.

CONCLUSION

What do we show by our examples of warranty, 247 battle of
the forms, 24s remedies, 249 money of the contract250 and a few
other miscellaneous quibbles? 251 Even where special interests
have obtained trade oriented special statutes, we find that the basic trouble in Article 2 is the same as a pervasive need in the practice of law-a greater degree of specialization in the treatment of
subject matter. General principles are there, when a broad view is
taken, but greater guidance in specialized application may be
needed. This is not surprising when one considers the manner in
which Article 2 was originally drafted.
244. See U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1978). For the full text of§ 2-209(5), see supra
note 240.
245. For a discussion of the cure requirements, see supra notes 224-25 and
accompanying text.
246. U.C.C. §§ 2-508(1) and (2) both require that the seller "seasonably
notify the buyer" of his intention to cure.
24 7. For a discussion of warranties, see supra notes 22-88 and accompanying text.
248. For a discussion of the battle of the forms, see supra notes 89-129 and
accompanying text.
249. For a discussion of remedies, see supra notes 130-88 and accompanying text.
250. For a discussion of the money of the contract, see supra notes 189-213
and accompanying text.
251. For a discussion of miscellaneous issues, see supra notes 214-46 and
accompanying text.

466

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31: p. 399

Some seventeen years ago Professor Grant Gilmore said, of
statutory drafting styles, obsolescence, and the Code:
The current style or fashion is to draft much more
tightly, with a desperate attempt at internal logical consistency and the avoidance of all ambiguity by the definition of all possible terms. That style is, surely, going to
make it more difficult to deal with the Code between now
and the year 2000, than it was to deal with the older acts
up to 1960.
Article 2 is, however, less subject to that criticism
than the rest of the Code. By comparison with Articles
like 9, Article 2, when you study it, seems to have been
drafted in a soft and mushy style. It doesn't quite go to
pieces on you like the old Sales Act, but it tends in that
direction. I take it that the explanation of why the style
of Article 2 is so different from the style of the rest of the
Code goes back to the drafting history of the Code. Article 2 was drafted first.252
Professor Gilmore then attributed some significance to his perception, largely true, that practitioners did not, early on, take the
Code project seriously, although they got into the act in later articles, particularly Article 9. 253 He then continued:
The practitioners never managed to get Professor Llewellyn to reopen the Sales Article, which stayed soft and
mushy. Everything in Article 2 turns on whether things
are done, or not done, in good faith and in a commercially reasonable fashion, sometimes on whether they are
done seasonably .... Out of that plastic material you can
make pretty much whatever you're going to need to
make in 1970 or 1990. 254
There is something of Gilmorean exaggeration in that last bit. Of
all the articles of the Code, Article 2 is the one that most needs to
bear in mind the description of the common law given just over a
half a century ago by a Harvard Law School professor. 255 After
252. P.F. COOGAN, supra note 92, at 102-03.
253. Id. at 103. ("To the practical people in the early 40's the so-called
Uniform Commercial Code was just a law professor's project like the Restatement,
and you didn't have to worry about it, and nobody worried about Article 2 until,
from the practitioner's point of view, it was too late.").
254. Id.
255. Gardner, An Inquiry Into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARV. L.
REV. l (1932). Professor Gardner was of the opinion that the intellectual appa-
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stating that many legal writers have concluded that the spirit of
the Anglo-American legal system can be epitomized in the concept of "reasonableness," Professor Gardner said:
Certainly that reasonableness has not consisted in the
construction of comprehensive series of definitions
under which every human relationship could be classified and filed. Still less has it consisted in the formulation of some fixed purpose, conceived of as the end of
law, to serve which every private and official action must
be made to bend. The strength of English law, as of
English government, resides in a traditional willingness
to hear the parties out on both the facts and the ethics of
their cases, to search patiently for the root of every controversy, and to decide it according to the interests and
habits of the parties principally involved. 256
A bit later in the same article, Professor Gardner identified commercial law as a legal system "whereby economic cooperation is
sought to be reconciled with an individualistic philosophy of
life." 25 7 He felt that the skill of the good commercial lawyer consisted in having developed the following arts: "the interpretation
of promises, the correct appreciation of values, the adaptation of
remedies to secure the benefits of commercial intercourse without risking the impairment of individual rights."2 58
The functions of the judge in commercial cases are the same
as those just mentioned for the commercial lawyers. The function
of a Code is to make it possible for judicial decisions to be made
"according to the interests and habits of the parties principally
involved." 259 Possibly a second function is to eliminate, as much
as possible, the need for "agreements otherwise" on terms of the
deal other than the essential "dickered terms" as to subject matter, quantity, quality where different levels thereof exist, delivery
timing and method, as well as guidelines for pricing.2 60
ratus employed to resolve contract problems should be as simple and direct as
possible.
256. Id. at 3.
257. Id. at 42.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 3.
260. For a discussion of this function regarding pricing, see supra notes
122-28 and accompanying text. U.C.C. § 2-305 should include some guidelines
for pricing for periodic payments or escalation for specially manufactured
goods, or at least make clear that where such types of pricing are bargained
about, or are usual and customary, a failure to agree results in no contract.
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The tight drafting desired by some practitioners makes for
ease of predictability in the practice of advising clients, but makes
very difficult the resolution of disputes arising out of those fact
patterns not envisaged by the draftsmen. Also, the Code should
provide for the recent technological changes in method and timing of communication caused by computerization and the interconnected telex system.261
The drafting process for revision of Article 2 should be predicated on a study of our eight sources, 262 especially an analysis of
the areas where practitioners have found difficulties under the
Code. The theme should be to preserve, wherever possible, Article 2's present structure, definitions, and format, while providing
for necessary adjustments. One such adjustment could be the
greater use of general business practices in lieu of the statutory
gap fillers as heretofore suggested. 263 Another suggestion would
be to provide some additional interpretive clauses in the text of
Article 2 in areas where application of Code principles to newly
developing factual situations would be hindered under current
state statutory construction laws.26 4 This could be helped by
261. See, e.g., Montello Oil Corp. v. Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740 F.2d 220 (3d
Cir. 1984). In Montello, the court adopted a time of dispatch rule to avoid attempting to solve the question of whether a telex message had been received
when the recipient's machine was not functioning as it had been shut off for the
night on the date the ten-day notice period for a U.C.C. § 2-702 reclamation
expired. Id.
262. To review, the eight sources are:
1. Non-uniform amendments.
2. Ad hoc statutes impinging on Code rules.
3. Volume of litigation engendered.
4. Conflicts of decision under the Code.
5. Judicial interpretation inconsistent with present reasonable commercial conduct.
6. Differences with the Restatements.
7. Variances from other legal systems.
8. Combined experience of merchant operators.
The eighth will require careful surveys conducted by questioners who have the
confidence of those being questioned. The "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" syndrome must be avoided.
263. For a discussion of the idea of greater use of general business practices in lieu of the statutory gap fillers, see supra notes 120-28 and accompanying
text.
264. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF BEALE AND WILLISTON 213, 218 (1934) ("Courts today have avowedly
rejected as part of their technique the doctrine of the equity of the statute.
Whatever significance statutes possess to govern results, they achieve by virtue
of being interpreted to include the particular situation."). The Pennsylvania
Statutory Construction Act, for example, provides: "(b) When the words of a
statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 192l(b)
(1975). The usual verbiage in statutory construction cases and statutes is that
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drafting with broad principles, followed by textual material in
subsequent sections or subsections giving illustrations of specific
applications on both sides of the coin, namely permissible approaches and impermissible approaches.265
Several hard policy decisions will be needed to determine the
extent to which consumer protections are to be included, 266 or
excluded in a revised Article 2. Whether the scope will be enlarged to cover commercial service contracts and other currently
excluded arrangements, and whether some "special" types of
contracts should be treated specially are other difficult questions.
But hard decisions are no excuse for no decisions. 267 We believe
we have demonstrated that Article 2 needs review to determine
the extent to which revision is essential. We invite the suggesstatutes in derogation of the common law shall be strictly construed. The Pennsylvania statute is a bit unusual, reading "(a) The rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed, shall have no application to the
statutes of this Commonwealth enacted finally after September I, 1937." Id.
§ l 928(a).
There is, thus, an attempt to preclude courts from applying the "equity of
the statute," a doctrine well settled in English law. See generally Landis, supra. See
also Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688 (1574) (pointing out that there is difference in scope between the "spirit" and the "letter" of many laws; scope of law
should always be determined in light of its spirit to prevent codal obsolescence).
265. See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GooDs, supra note 21. But there, the illustrative material is only
on one side. Too much work cannot be assigned to official comments, as a court
can readily rule that they are not a part of the statute.
266. Certain areas have been omitted from this article's survey of the interrelation of Article 2 and various states' consumer protection laws. For example,
both Alaska and Indiana have made their door-to-door sales act part of their
Code by non-uniform amendments. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.350 (1985); IND.
CoDE § 26-19-631 to -633 (19-). There are similar statutes on door-to-door
sales in other states. Colorado refers to its Brand Inspection Law in a nonuniform U.C.C. § 2-511(4) and also in its U.C.C. § 2-401(5). See Cow. REV.
STAT. § 4-2-511(4) (Supp. 1985); id. § 4-2-401(3) (1973). Montana and Oregon
follow the same pattern. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-40-1(4), (5) (1983); OR.
REV. STAT. § 72.4010(4), (5) (1984). Cattle bill of sale acts referring to brand
inspections are on the books in many states.
We have also not considered many consumer statutes such as deceptive
trade practices acts, retail motor vehicle installment sales acts or the "all goods"
retail installment sales acts. Nor have we considered the impact of the many
statutes awarding attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs.
267. Interestingly, even in the Code's relatively early stages of development
and adoption the following statement appeared:
If the Code is to stay current and vigorous, it must undergo periodic revision. This is the charge of the Editorial Board. Thus far the
Code has been drafted and redrafted on the basis of how a number of
experienced, responsible people thought it would work. The time has
now come for detailed field studies to find how it actually is working
and how it can be improved.
Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
Cm. L. REV. 469, 493 (l 963).
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tions of others. Ultimately, if further comments by others support our conclusions, the Permanent Editorial Board should
obtain funding for a thorough study and the drafting of revisions.
Even though, in many cases where some confusion now exists,
interpretation can lead to commercially appropriate results, it has
not always done so. Amendments, although not of great length,
can save much subsequent travail and woe, especially if enacted in
the form of declaratory legislation.268
268. See U.C.C. § 11-108 (1978) ("Presumption that Rule of Law Continues Unchanged. Unless a change in law has clearly been made, the provisions of [new
U.C.C.] shall be deemed declaratory of the meaning of the [old U.C.C.]."). We
believe that the title and wording of § 11-108 could be more solicitously stated
to provide that unless such interpretation is unreasonable, the changes made by
amendments shall be construed as declaratory of and as clarifying the legislative
intent of the Code as previously worded.

